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A cigarette is the perfect Dpe of a pefctpleasure. It is exquisite, and it leaves
one unsalifed. What more can you want?1
The recondliation of individual rights and communiy values on the streets is a
profoundly difficult problem. For a problem so intractable, a pluralisic legal ap-
proach is advisable. Judges should refrain from using the generally worded clauses
of the United States Constitution to create a national code that denies cities suffi-
dent room to expetiment. .. .2
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY in COLLECTED WORKS OF OSCAR
WILDE: THE PLAYS, THE POEMS, THE STORIES AND THE ESSAYS INCLUDING DE PROFUNDIs 70
(1989).
2. Robert C. Ellickson, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1247-48 (1996).
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INTRODUCTION
A. Private v. Public Rights
Obdurate tobacco smokers have always argued that, in a democratic
country such as America, they have unfettered freedom to smoke anywhere
and any time they wish.3 The on-going debate over this issue continues often
lacking candor and being driven by two central propositions: that all tobacco
companies are evil incarnate and teen smoking must be stopped at all costs.
4
While the United States Supreme Court has never recognized a constitu-
tionally protected right to any particular style of life,5 smoking as an expressive
act of autonomy has been protected by the First Amendment.6 The extent to
which judicial protection is given to life style actions is, however, always
checked 7 by the right of the state to prevent identifiable social harms. 8 Seen as
3. David B. Ezra, Note, Smoker Battegy: An Antidote to Second Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL. L.
RaV. 1061, 1069 (1990). See also Doug Levy, Smokers Fight Back Against Local Cigarette Laws, USA
TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997, at 5D. But see Robert J. Samuelson, Do Smoker's Have Rights?, WASH.
POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at A21 (concluding smokers are the new disadvantaged minorities who
"apparently" no longer have sustainable legal rights). See generall Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of
Faith: Tobacco and the Madison Democray, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 433 (2000).
4. RobertJ. Samuelson, Smoking Fictions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1998, at A17. ButseeJohn
Schwartz, Haze Begins to Clear over Hazards of Passive Smoking, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1997, at A3
(showing the growing realization that various governmental agency reports are, indeed, correct
in concluding secondhand smoke is a carcinogen as hazardous as radon, yet accepting the fact
that the true level of risk posed by exposure to this hazard will be very difficult to ever establish
firmly); Marc Kaufman, Secondhand Smoke Poses Heart Attack Risk CDC Warns, WASH. POST, Apr.
23, 2004, at Al (reporting on the findings of a recent study published in the British Medical
Journal confirming the surprises associated with second hand smoke). See also Abigail Tanford,
At Sea With the Marlboro Man, Aug. 15, 2000, at Z05 (reporting that one in five teenagers
smoke); Marc Kaufman, Anti-Smoking Units Failed to Stop Teens: Students Were Studied for 15 Years,
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2000, at A3; Ceci Connolly, Teen Girls Using Pills, Smoking More Than Boys,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at A3 (reporting on results of the most recent 2004 survey by the
White House Office of National Drug Control finding which shows conclusively-for the past
two years-that more young women (730,000) than men started smoking, and 675,000 began
smoking marijuana).
5. LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 848 (2d ed. 1988).
6. Id. at 1167. Although never explicitly recognizing a right to smoke, in Allgyer v. Louisi-
ana, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the right to be free from physical restraint and
embraced "the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways." 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). This holding, arguably, secures for the
smoker an implied right to smoke. Alan S. Kaufman, Comment, Where There's Smoke There's
Fire: The Search for Legal Paths to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 62, at 68, n. 36 (1976-
77). In a more recent case, N.Y.C. CLA.S.H., Inc. v. Cioy of New York, a federal district court
held that smoking is not essential to the enjoyment of associates in New York City restaurants
and bars. Likewise, by extended application, it could be argued that smoking is also not an
essential right for either association and assembly or public leaders. 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
7. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 554.
8. Id. at 852.
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a form of symbolic speech, and thus subject to reasonable restrictions placed
on its use in public forums, places and manner of use,9 smoking is also be-
coming more and more recognized as a social medical harm as well.10 While a
basis for abridging various practices of a life style cannot be based on either
public intolerance or animosity," which smoking surely engenders, the fact
that its use is now documented-medically-as a significant cause of illness
allows the government to regulate, if not prohibit, its use in public forums. 12
"Perfect pleasures," such as those found in alcohol consumption and
cigarette smoking, give rise to hedonistic delights. 13 Whether this pursuit of
hedonism and the extolation of pleasure or happiness is the highest good re-
mains an open question. The central question is whether smokers have a fun-
damental right to engage in behavior patterns-the pleasures and pains of
which are mainly theirs-without societal approbation and punishment. More
and more, society shows less respect to smokers than it appears to pity them
and put them on the road to smokeless salvation.
14
In a democratic society, once the state apprises its citizens of the harmful
medical consequences of tobacco use-and safeguards those who wish to
avoid environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)-it has been suggested that one's
right to commit "suicide by degree" through use of smoking is a "basic hu-
man right" which must be accommodated.' 5 Autonomy, then, is two sided
and allows for not only the freedom to choose what is beneficial, but which is
harmful as well.
Yet, for those asserting autonomous rights of decisionmaking, comes re-
alization that for every right there is a coordinate responsibility that the pri-
9. Id. at 1142.
10. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 51, 52 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 2000). See Jennifer
Huget, Smoke Gets in Their Eyes, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2005, at F1 (detailing the reasons behind
the fact that forty-six million U.S. adults, or 22.5 percent of the population, continue to
smoke-among them being that cigarettes smell good, are relaxing, considered a normal hobby,
and a way to cope with stress). But see Libby Copeland, Got a Light? A Ritual Gone in a Puff of
Smoke, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at Cl (reporting on the effect of widening prohibitions on
smoking in public places as blunting the use of cigarettes as social instruments of seduction).
See generaly Nigel Gray, Time to Change Atitudes to Tobacco: Product Regulation over Five Years?, 100
ADDICTION 575 (2005).
11. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1409. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 612, 615 (1971).
12. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 10.
13. See generally Robert F. Cochran, From Cigarettes to Alcohol: The Next Step in Hedonic Product
Liabiliy?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 702 (2000).
14. Samuelson, supra note 3.
15. Mano Vargas Llosa, A Languid Sort of Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at A26. See
Gina Kolata, Exchanging Cigarettes for Bagels, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2004, at A3 (discussing how
some statistical correlations show a definite connection between smoking and obesity-for, as
national body weights have risen from 1980 to 2000, "'smoking rates fell by 27 percent... as a
whole and by 38 percent among middle-aged Americans;" and the findings of economists at the
Graduate Center of the City University of New York "that for every 10 percent increase in the
prce of cigarettes, the numbers of obese people rises 2 percent"-with the estimate being that
smoking cessation accounts for twenty percent of the national increase in obesity).
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mary right to be exercised reasonably. Issues of public health, then, shape the
extent to which an assertion of autonomy may be acknowledged and asserted.
The sobering statistics of tobacco use are indisputable-with its use ac-
counting for approximately 400,000,00 deaths each year among Americans
which in turn accounts for nineteen percent of all total deaths. 16 Tobacco use
also contributes significantly to deaths arising from cancer, cardiovascular
disease, lung disease, etc.17 Even with these statistics, the tobacco industry
continues to expend eleven billion dollars a year on advertising to promote its
products. 18 And, while the time has long past where the cigarette is seen
rightly as a cultural accessory, 19 there is disturbing evidence that advertising
efforts of the tobacco industry are aided by the ongoing efforts of the motion
picture industry to reinstate and glamorize the act of smoking.20 In 2000, it
16. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 10, at 51, 52. In 1990, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention estimated that the number of tobacco use deaths was
418,690,000 and included thirty percent of all cancer deaths and twenty-one percent of cardio-
vascular disease deaths. Id. See also Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2004 Surgeon General's
Report-The Health Consequences of Smoking,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statstics/sgr/sgr.2004/index.htm#full (showing conclu-
sively, for the first time, that smoking causes diseases in every organ of the body and reporing
that the economic costs of smoking, in the United States, exceeds $157 billion each year-with
seventy-five billion dollars being attributable to medical costs and another eighty-two billion
dollars in lost productivity). Indeed, a new study concludes that direct medical costs to non-
smokers exposed to secondhand smoke is about five billion dollars annually, while indirect
costs-including lost wages and disability costs total approximately $4.7 billion. Theo Francis,
Moving the Market: Study Tallies Annual Cost of Secondhand Smoke, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2005, at
C3.
17. PUBLIC HEALTH LAw AND ETHICS, supra note 10, at 51, 52. See Bridget M. Kuehn,
Link Between Smoking and Mental Illness May Lead to Treatments, 295 JAMA 483 (2006). "Since
1964, 10 million people have died from smoking related illnesses." Jack Gillum, Strong Words,
Images Target Smoking, USA TODAY, July 13, 2003, at 1 OD.
18. Allan M. Brandt & Julius B. Richmond, Tobacco Pandemic, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at
A21. See Alex Kuczynski, Big Tobacco Newest Bill Boards Are on the Pages of Its Magaines, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1999, at Al (discussing how tobacco companies-in response to severe restric-
tions on how they advertise-are using publishers of consumer magazines as new marketing
outlets for advertising tobacco products). See also George D. Smith & Andrew N. Phillips,
Passive Smoking and Health: Should We Believe Phillo Morris's Experts?, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 929 (Oct.
12, 1996) (reporting how the tobacco industry magnifies doubt and confusion in the minds of
the public and seeks to discredit evidence that environmental tobacco smoke is detrimental to
health over the meaningful health risks to nonsmokers exposed to environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS)).
19. Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in SMOKING: WHO HAS
THE RIGHT? at ch. 15 Jeffrey A. Schaler & Magda E. Schaler eds., 1998).
20. See Ian Johns, Sey Cigarette Chic from Bogart and Dietrich to W'es, THE LONDON TIMES,
July 26, 2002, at 15 (recounting how early movies with the advent of sound in the 1920s, en-
couraged their actors to look calm and "cool" by smoking-thus giving rise to "'cigarette sex"
on the screen which was seen as "a useful shorthand for foreplay"; and then observing how on
screen smoking fell out of favor in the health conscious 1980s). See Chris Hasungs, Hollywood
Faces Fuy as Smoking on Screen Returns to 1950s Level, SUN. TELE., Mar. 7, 2004, at 15 (reporting
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was determined that 8.8% of all deaths globally were associated with cigarette
smoking which marked a forty-five percent increase in tobacco deaths since
1990.21 By the year 2030, projections show tobacco use deaths will double by
ten million-with the developing nations accounting for seventy percent of
this increase.
22
More and more, smoking is assuming the attributes of not only anti-
social action, but of social deviance. As such, it thereby assumes the role of a
social divider. Smokers are, accordingly, presented with essentially two alter-
natives: they may accept and follow a contemporary standard of civility which
seeks to minimize the effects of ETS on others23 or be excluded from arenas




Civility has been defined, alternatively, as "good breeding, refinement"
and "behavior proper to the intercourse of civilized people; ordinary courtesy
or politeness as opposed to rudeness of behavior." 25 As Mayor of New York
City in 1998, Rudolph W. Guiliani chose to define it as "the basic respect you
have to have for the law"'26 and moved to restrict various forms of offensive
street life from sidewalk food vendors, 27 discourteous cab drivers,28 and con-
frontational beggars29 to slow, foot-dragging pedestrians 30 and to "gum-
dropping litterbugs." 31 Michael Bloomberg, Mayor Guiliani's successor, has
that a study of 150 films made from 1950 to 2002 found there to be presently approximately
eleven depictions of smoking, typically, in every hour of film making).
21. Brandt & Richmond, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Gusfield, supra note 19.
24. Blake D. Poland, Smoking Stigma, and The Purification of Public Space, in SMOKING: WHO
1HAS THE RIGHT? 189, 190 (Jeffrey A Schaler & Magda E. Schaler eds., 1998).
25. Civility, I1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 447, 448 (1961).
26. Blaine Harden, 'Tudy's Bunker" Keeps New York's Guiliani in the Line of Fire, WASH. POST,
June 21, 1998, at A3. See also Norimitsu Onishi, Be Polite or Else, Guiliani Warns in Announcing
Citilio Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at Al.
27. Harden, supra note 26.
28. Id. See also Editorial, You Talking to Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,1998, at A12.
29. Vivian S. Toy, New York Cioy Acts to Tighten Begging Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, at
Al; Clifford J. Levy, CoundlApproves Restrictions on Beggars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1996, at B4. See
also Rene Sanchez, City of Tolerance Tires of Homeless: San Francisco Aims to Roust Street Dwellers,
WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1998, at A3 (dealing with San Francisco's effort to clear its public streets
of the homeless who beg, bicker and sleep there).
30. Verena Dobmk, Mayor Puts His Foot Down on Pedestrians, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1997, at
A12.
31. Frank Lombardi, Stickin' It to Gum Chewers, Rudy Issues Ticket Warning, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 22, 1998, at 7. The Irish government sought, unsuccessfully, to impose a special
tax of approximately six cents a pack on gum-this, in an attempt to curtail purchases of gum
and cover the costs of gum removals from public sidewalks, streets and buildings. Instead of
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sought to build upon this record by not only making New York City more
quiet 32 but its restaurants and bars smokeless. 33 In Washington, D.C., civility
was broadened to include a vociferous pre-boarding bus patron talking on her
cell phone who was arrested and handcuffed when she refused to lower her
voice.
34
Walking down the streets of any major metropolitan area brings count-
less assaults to the senses of the average pedestrian. Vulgar, loud-mouthed
passers-by make life on the sidewalks and streets a challenge for those de-
fenseless individuals not disposed to similar conduct. Dodging bicyclists rid-
ing on pedestrian designated sidewalks is commonplace. "Music" filters from
unsecured head sets or earphones not only from the sidewalk foot traffic, but
from the streets where road warrior automobile drivers with rolled-down win-
dows serenade the passerby at levels of ninety decibels or more. Loud, and
often animated cell phone banterings add to the level of discomfort on the
sidewalks. Leashed and unleashed animals, and the products of their nature,
present further roadblocks to sidewalk discourse and mobility. Pan handlers
present yet other obstacles to the flow of foot traffic. And, of course, visual
acuity is challenged by tasteless graffiti on the outside walls of office buildings
and buses.
35
Perhaps no more serious threat to the olfactory sense is to be found that
in environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) or second hand smoke.36 As hun-
taxing gum as a deterrent to consumption, the Chewing Gum Action Group advocates public
education plans and fines. In some fifteen cities this summer, gum chewers who spit out in
public places were assessed maximum fines of ninety-two dollars; and such fines have had the
effect of decreasing gum littering by upwards of eighty percent. Cesar G. Soriano, Europe Tries
to Eradicate Gum Crime, USA TODAY, July 25, 2006, at 7A.
32. See Michael Powell, Mayor Pushes Initiative for a Quieter New York, Many Resident Say: Fat
Chance, Bloomber, WASH. POST, June 13, 2004, at A3 (detailing how the mayor wants his "police
officers to issue fines for everything from180-decibel industrial-strength construction genera-
tors to Chihuahuas who yip more than 5 minutes, to ... ice cream trucks that ... jingle" their
bells too long).
33. Jennifer Steinhauer, Bloomberg Seeks to Ban Smoking in Every City Restaurant and Bar, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al. See 24 N.Y. CITY RULES, § 10-02 (2003) (prohibiting smoking in all
indoor areas of all places of employment and public places but allowing limited exceptions for
tobacco businesses); see also N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW Art. 13-E §1399-n through 1399-x
(McKinney's 2005) (regulating smoking in bars, food service establishments, places of employ-
ments, etc., but granting exceptions to cigar bars, outdoor dining areas, private homes and
automobiles, etc.); Winnie Hu, New York State Adopts Strict Ban on Workplace Smoking N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 27, 2003, at D2 (observing that the "state ban would apply to localities that either
do not have any anti smoking laws, or that have less restrictive ones").
34. Lindsay Layton, Between Metro and Cell User, a Disconnect Officer Shoves, Arrests Pregnant
Woman Over Loud Call, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2004, at Al.
35. See generally Editorial, You Talking to Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at A12; Elhickson,
supra note 2.
36. See Kaufman, supra note 4 (reporting on a new advisory from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention that confirms that secondhand smoke-with as little as thirty minutes'
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dreds of pedestrians use the public streets and sidewalks to advance their
business and social pursuits, they are smothered on an hourly basis by smoke
of this nature.37 Either on their way to work or taking rest periods, many cii-
zens believe they have a constitutional right to smoke on open streets expos-
ing, their fellow pedestrian-citizens to significant health risks and raising sig-
nificant and unreasonable barrier to civil discourse.38 Put simply and directly,
alfresco inhalation should join its indoor counterpart as a banned activity-a
public health nuisance, to be sure. As public space, the sidewalk must be free
of becoming carcinogenic incubators for the citizenry.
39
C. Shaping New Values
When new or exogenous values enter the fabric of democracy, ideally
they are shaped by legislatures instead of the courts. Yet, a persuasive argu-
ment can be made for the courts to "legislate" these new norms or values-
especially economic ones-when they are underestimated or ignored in legis-
lation.40
Public health concerns over cigarette smoking are an example of a new
societal value that is rooted not only in health but economics as well; for, the
consequences of public smoking negatively impact the health expenditures
that local, state, and national governments make. The public consequences
exposure-can increase significantly the risk of heart attack and causes 35,000 heart disease
deaths a year in the United States).
In his new report on secondhand smoke, issued in June, 2006, the U.S. Surgeon Gen-
eral found that "[t]here is no safe level of secondhand smoke of this nature and, even brief
exposure can cause harm. ... While exposure has declined ... 60 percent of non-smokers in
America show biological evidence of encountering secondhand smoke, and it is estimated 22
percent of children are exposed to secondhand smoke in their homes. Only smoke-free build-
ings and public places-which should include public streets and sidewalks-truly protect non-
smokers from the health hazards of passive or secondhand smoke." John O'Neil, Hazard of
Second Hand Smoke 'Clear,' Surgeon General Says, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 28, 2006, at 4. See
also Lauran Neergaard, Surgeon General Warns of Secondhand Smoke, ABC HEALTH NEws, June 26,
2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=2123936.
37. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1177. See generally Richard P. Sargent et al., Reduced Incidence of
Admissions for Myocardial Infarton Associated uith Public Smoking Ban: Before and After Study, 328
BRIT. MED.J. 977 (April 24, 2004) (studying the health effects on residents of Helena, Montana,
when public smoking was banned); see also Terry F. Pechacek & Stephen Babb, Commentary:
How Acute and Reversible are the Cardiovascular Risks of Second Hand Smoke?, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 980
(April 24, 2004) (confirming the significance of the Helena, Montana, study of public smoking
and the real concerns of exposure to secondhand smoke).
38. See generally John M. Barth, Comment, The Pubc Smoking Controvery: Constitutional Protec-
ton v. Common Courtesy, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 215 (1986). But see Samuelson, supra
note 3.
39. See Bruce B. Cohen, Killer Smoke, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at A17 (observing that "at
least 60 known carcinogens have been identified in secondhand smoke'; Francis, supra note 16.
40. George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Mophogenesis of an Histoncal Revisionist Theory of
EconomicJuri prudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 739-40 (1995).
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also jeopardize, if not destroy, lives of citizens. The Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention released information showing 8.6 million Americans have
chronic illnesses (for example chronic bronchitis, emphysema, or heart attack)
which are related to smoke.
41
Legislative bodies and the courts have the capacity to meet, if not con-
tain, cigarette smoking by contemporizing the vitality of the common law
doctrine of nuisance through creative use of the specific doctrine of anticipa-
tory nuisance. Legislative bodies and courts also have the capacity to codify
the "traditional" balancing test used by the Restatement of Torts to determine
whether an unreasonable act has become a nuisance42 into legislative drafting
standards at the local and state levels. What a judge balances in every legal
action is, in essence, the values-here, economic, private and public health-
safeguarded by holding for the plaintiff as opposed to the values of what is
sacrificed in defeating plaintiffs' claims. 43 Similarly, when one legislative goal
of protecting the public health is pursued, individual liberties of choice to
smoke with impunity must be curtailed to advance the common goal of a
good, healthy life for the greatest numbers of citizens possible.
Rather than cast the analysis within a central framework of constitutional
law, emphasis will instead be placed on the undergirding and unifying princi-
ples of property law as the guiding vector of force in dealing with the abate-
ment of public cigarette smoking. Part I of this article surveys the changing
cultural and socio-political values which shape the present debate on the limits
of smoking. Part II of this article presents the public health predicate as the
underlying justification for developing tobacco control strategies. Part III
explores how these strategies have a historic grounding and contemporary
relevance within the common law of nuisance. The potential use and applica-
tion of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance is tested as a feasible remedy to
abate cigarette smoking in Part IV. Difficulties in applying tobacco contain-
ment policies in public spaces and then in restricted environments is next
investigated in Parts V and VI respectively. In Part VII, the value and impor-
tance of local ordinances, as an integral part of a tobacco control strategy, is
shown; and Part VIII investigates further the nature of current legislative ef-
forts to resolve the issue of tobacco control and abatement. Finally, Part IX
analyzes the need for strengthening legislative drafting approaches to the cen-
tral issue and concludes that by integrating common law principles and per-
mutations of nuisance law into legislative frameworks, a strong model for
containing cigarette smoke can be achieved.
41. 8.6 Milion Have Smoking Related Illness, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at A9.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, 827(a)-(d), 8 2 8(a)-(c), 831 (1977).
43. See Richard A. Posner, TheJurijprudence of Skeptidsm, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 891 (1988).
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I. PUBLIC HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
The aim or goal of public health is "to reduce disease and maintain the
health of the population."44 As for tobacco use, specifically, the goal is more
ambitious in that not only does public health seek to "reduce disease, disability
and death related to tobacco use through prevention and cessation," but to
protect nonsmokers from environmental tobacco smoke or ETS.
45
The prevention of disease and the advancement of health-promoting
conditions for the people is always preferable to cure.
46 In order to secure the
public health, "organized community effort" must be undertaken in what is
now seen as a multi-dimensional goal since "health" includes not only those
concerns listed previously, but also decent housing, adequate income, public
education, etc. 47 By widening the traditional boundaries of public health, the
role of government is also expanded. One view holds the government should
seek to ensure for all citizens the basic means to attain the "good life" yet
refrain from detailing the content of that life other than preventing others
from infringing on the "inalienable rights" to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.48 The alternative view is that the government is but a facilitator of
communal values and, as such, exists to define, and then accommodate, reen-
forcing goals for combating social ills.49 As such, politics, culture, and eco-
nornics all combine 0 as vectors of force in shaping and in testing policy in
this area.
No doubt one of the central most justifications for public health inter-
vention is the need to advance the greatest good (for example health) for the
greatest number of people5 l and thereby achieve economies of scale through
sound benefit-cost policies.5 2 Thus, public health and safety are equated with
the pursuit of and maintenance of the common good.53 With government
actions that seek to not only promote health and prevent injury and disease
come inevitable interferences with personal liberties and economic free-
doms.54 As always, the test becomes the extent to which a sound balance is
struck between these two rights.
44. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 10, at 31.
45. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SvCS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 383 (2000) [hereinafter REDUCING TOBACCO USE]. The Institute of Medi-
cine defines "'public health" as "what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions
for people to be healthy." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19
(1988).
46. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 10, at 34.
47. Id. at 38.
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 65.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 155-57.
53. Id. at 165.
54. Id. at 157.
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The advancement of public health was a paramount value in the Multi-
state Tobacco Settlement Agreement (MSA) of 1998 which settled suits
brought in forty-six states against tobacco manufacturers to recover Medicaid
expenditures for treating smoking related illnesses.55 As a result of the settle-
ment, "participating manufacturers will pay out nearly $206 billion over the
next 25 years to the settling states and territories."5 6 The settlement marks a
milestone in the long and arduous battle to make tobacco manufacturers ac-
countable for the harm caused by their products.
While there is a common perception that the war against tobacco ended
after this historic settlement agreement, this is not the case.57 Tobacco regula-
55. REDUCING TOBACCO USE, supra note 45, at 193; see Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen.,
Master Settlement Agreement,
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/mszpdf/1109185724-1032468605cigmsa.pdf
MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO
POLITICS 164-83 (2d ed. 2005); Laura Hermer, Municipal Home Rule in New York: Tobacco Control
at the LocalLevel, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 321 (1999) (discussing issues left open by the MSA which
will become issues in the future); Ellen Wertheimeir, Pandora's Humidor Tobacco Producer Leabihky
in Tort, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 397 (1997).
56. Hermer, supra note 55, at 322. Sadly, "cash-strapped state governments are spending
nearly half of the $7.9 billion they received in tobacco settlement money in 2003 went for gen-
eral purposes" instead of for tobacco education, treatment, and public health. Vanessa
O'Connell, States Siphon OffBigger Share of Tobacco-Settlement Money, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2003, at
Al. Although not required to direct settlement monies for smoking-related purposes, many
state legislatures indicated this would be done. Id. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Determinants of
States' Allocations of the Master Settlement Agreement Payments, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 643
(2005) (analyzing the effects of voter characteristics, political parties, interest groups, etc. on
allocation decisions for the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement and concluding that tobacco-
producing states and those having a higher proportion of conservative Democrats, elderly,
African-Americans, or Hispanics, in general spent less money on tobacco control); States Faing
to Spend Tobacco Settlement Funds on Prevention, 16 ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY. 3 (2004)
(discussing a new report showing thirty-seven states are funding tobacco prevention pro-
grams-if at all-at less than half of the recommended funding level by the Centers for Disease
Control); A BROKEN PROMISE TO OUR CHILDREN: THE 1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
SEVEN YEARS LATER (2005). But see Marc Kaufman, Smokzng in U.S. Declines: Cigarette Sales at a
54-Year Low, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at Al (reporting on a national decline in cigarette sales,
which is causing financial losses for some states--this, because tobacco industry settlement
payments to the states are tied, to some extent, to the number of cigarettes sold).
57. See Alan Scott, The Continuing Tobacco War State and Local Tobacco Control in Washington,
23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1097 (2000) (discussing unresolved tobacco issues); see also Carol D.
Leonnig, U.S. Trial against Tobacco Industy Opens, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2004, at A3 (reporting
on the largest civil racketeering trial ever maintained by the Justice Department alleging, as
such, for the last fifty years, that the nation's largest tobacco companies-notably Philip Morris
and R.J. Reynolds-sought to deceive the public about the scientifically proven damages of
smoking in a direct attempt to protect profits the industry earned from the sale of cigarettes).
On February 4, 2005, the court ruled against the government in United States v. Philip Morris,
U.S.A., Inc.., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Then, on August 17, 2006, U.S. District Court
Judge Gladys Kessler, in a 1,742 page opinion, ordered Philip Morris and seven other tobacco
companies, to undertake a massive, court-supervised, ten-year public media campaign to correct
years of misrepresentation which had deceived the public about the health hazards of smoking.
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tion continues on at the state and local levels. Further, because the MSA did
not address several key issues, such as protection of nonsmokers from sec-
ondhand smoke, there is significant opportunity for state and local govern-
ments to step in and address this health problem. 58 The MSA's silence on
secondhand smoke mirrors the uncertainty in society as to how far the law
should reach into regulating this unsettled area. Current litigation reflects that
regulation of second hand smoke is the next issue for courts, legislatures and
municipalities to address in the continuing battle over tobacco controls. 59 In
order to regulate secondhand smoke, municipalities must address two con-
cerns: the need of lawmakers to justify these regulations which necessarily
intrude on individual rights and, secondly, the establishment of the proper
authority and power to regulate secondhand smoke.
A. Teenage Addiction and the FDA
Findings by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) con-
cluded that "[m]ore than a third of high school students who try cigarettes
develop a daily smoking habit before they graduate. ' ' 60 For those continuing
on to college, the Harvard School of Public Health found smoking among
college students has increased substantially in recent years-all signaling great
dangers for the health of the next generation of adults. 61 Of equal concern are
Specific terms such as "low tar," "light," and "mild" were outlawed. The District Court could
not impose the $280 billion sought by the government, but a fourteen billion dollar penalty to
cover the costs of assisting those wishing to stop smoking and for an education marketing plan
to discourage smoking initially was granted. Henri E. Wauvm & Robert Stein, Big Tobacco Lied
to Public, Judge Says: Industy Avoids Huge Penalies but Is Ordered to Correct False Advertising, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at 1 (summarizing United States v. Philip Morms USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)). But see Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, at 53-56 (Ill. 2005) (de-
termining that since the Federal Trade Commission had approved the use of light and low tar
labels on packages of cigarettes, Philip Morris could not be held liable for a $10.1 billion judg-
ment awarded by a lower state court to the 1.14 million current and former Illinois citizen
smokers for alleged deception by the labeling by Philip Morris of "light" and "low tar" ciga-
rettes as safer than regular cigarettes).
58. See id. "[]he MSA is completely silent on ETS and smoking in public places." Her-
mer, supra note 55, at 360. See also Nat'l. Assn. of Attorneys Gen., supra note 55; DERTHICK,
supra note 55 at, at 71-92.
59. See generaly Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 743 So. 2d 24 (1999); Duncan v. Nw
Airlines, 208 F.3d 1112, 1112 (2000) (suing for injuries related to secondhand smoke).
60. Of Teens Wbo Tgy Cigarettes 36% Gain a Habit, Survey Finds, WASH. POST, May 22, 1998,
at A2. A new report from the CDC has found that while cigarette smoking continues to de-
crease among U.S. adults, its prevalence among certain segments of society continues to be
troubling-with "one in three persons with a 9th- 11th grade education smok[ing]." Cigarette
Smoking Among Adults-United States, 2004, 295 JAMA 749, 750 (2006). A subsequent report of
the CDC disclosed that a significant plateau at 2 0.9 % had been reached for adult cigarette
smokers as well as a "similar levehng-off in" comparable rates for teenage smokers. Rob Stein,
Drop in Smoking Rates Stall, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2006, at A10.
61. Henry Wechsler et al., Increase Levels of Cigarette Use among College Students: A Cause for
National Concern, 280 JAMA 1673 (1998).
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the figures which show each day 4,000 youth under the age eighteen try smok-
ing for the first time, and 1,000 of those children become regular smokers.
62
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken an aggressive role
in trying to regulate access to tobacco smoking for teenagers 63-owing in
large part to indisputable research which has found smoking morbidity and
mortality reduced significantly when access to cigarettes is curtailed. 64 In
1996, the FDA promulgated regulations designed to not only ban cigarette
sales in vending machines and restrict advertising to black and white text for-
mat in publications having more than fifteen percent young readership, but
also to ban billboard advertisement of tobacco within 1,000 feet of a school or
playground 65 and require the tobacco industry to fund a year-long anti-
tobacco media campaign.
66
Prior to this direct effort to restrict juvenile smoking, past congressional
efforts included: passage in 1965 of The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act which required all cigarette packages to carry health warnings; 67 the Public
62. See FDA Authorioy over Tobacco: Legislation Will Protect Kids and Save Lives, Feb. 15, 2007,
www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/fda. By way of comparison, the U.S. Center for Disease
Control and Prevention estimated in 1997 that twenty-three percent of adults nationwide
smoke-with the state of Kentucky leading with one in three adults lighting up in 1997. Where's
the Smoke?, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1998, at Z05. Yet a recent report by the Natonal Associa-
tion of Attorneys' General Tobacco Committee found the nation's per capita consumption of
tobacco fell by 4 .2 % in 2005 which, in turn, reflected an overall drop by more than twenty
percent since the tobacco settlement in 1998. Marc Kaufman, Smoking in U.S. Declines Shabply,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at Al. The report attributed this decline to advertisement restric-
tions, aggressive anti-smoking campaigns, and higher cigarette prices, the average of which in
2004 was $3.16--compared with $1.74 a pack in 1997. Id. It was concluded that the natonal
goal set for 2010 of having no more than fifteen percent of youths and twelve percent of adults
smoking is achievable. Id. But see Colleen McCain Nelson, Smoking Foes Use Laws to Won Hearts
and Lungs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 1A (commenting on statistics from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showing that in 2004, 20.9% of Americans said
they smoke regularly).
63. See PETER D. JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS:
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 8 (1997).
64. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE (1994).
65. Donald W. Garner, Banning Tobacco Billboards: The Case for MunidpalAction, 275 JAMA
1263, 1263 (1996).
66. See generally Christina F. Pinto, Measures to Control Tobacco Use: Immuniy, Adverlziing Re-
strictions and FDA Controls as Proposed in the Failed Tobacco Settlement, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 307 (1998); DERTHICK, supra note 55, at 65-67. The overall estimated average monthly
exposure of adolescents to state-funded advertising against tobacco use decreased substantially
in 2003 over that recorded from 1999 to 2002-this, no doubt because of state budget defi-
ciencies. A minimum adolescent exposure to anti-tobacco television spots should be one per
month. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Estimated Exposure of Adolescents to State-
Funded Anti-Tobacco Television in Advertsements-37 States and the District of Columbia, 1993-2003,
295 JAMA 751, 752 (2006) [hereinafter CDC Report].
67. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1333 (2004). In 2001, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts
many state cigarette advertising restrictons. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 548
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Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 which banned all cigarette advertising
from television and radio;68 and the 1992 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental
Health Agency Reorganization Act which, among other provisions, provides
incentives for all the states to enact and enforce laws against the sale and dis-
tribution of tobacco products to individuals under the age of eighteen years.
69
In 1994, Congress passed the Pro Children Act which prohibits smoking in
those indoor facilities used routinely for delivery of various services to chil-
dren (for example schools, libraries, day care centers, health care facilities, and
early childhood development centers).
70
B. The National Action Plan for Tobacco Cessation
In August 2002, then Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Tommy G. Thompson convened a special investigatory sub-
committee to study and shape national efforts to combat cigarette smoking.
Its report was issued February 11, 2003.71
Central to the ambitious recommendations of the subcommittee are: ef-
forts to increase the Federal Excise Tax on cigarettes by two dollars a pack;
72
(2001). Previously, in 2000, the High Court ruled that the FDA could not regulate cigarettes
and most other tobacco products as nicotine delivery devices. Food & Drug Adm. v. William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
68. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1340 (2004).
69. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26
(2004). For a general history of cigarette regulation, see RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES:
AMEIcA's HUNDRED YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE UNABASHED
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996). On October 10, 2004, the U.S. Senate approved a bill,
called the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which, if it had been enacted
into legislation, would have empowered the FDA to regulate the sale, distribution and advertis-
ing of cigarettes and tobacco products. S. 2974, 108th Cong. (2004). For a discussion of the
arguments for and against that bill, see Edward Alden & Neil Buckley, All Cigarette Makers But
One Oppose FDA Regulation Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 19, 2004, at 6.
70. Pro-Children Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. % 6081-6083 (2004). See generally Richard W.
O'Neal, Close But No Cigar A Comparaive Analysis of the FDA's Attempt to Regulate Tobacco Use, 30
GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. & ECON. 481 (1996-97); Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)Sense and
Sensibihoy, 22 So. ILL. L. REv. 677 (1998).
71. Michael C. Fiore et al., Preventing 3 Milon Premature Deaths and Heoing 5 Milon Smokers
Quit A National Plan for Tobacco Cessation, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 205 (2004). In a report issued
by the American Lung Association, forty states and the Distnct of Columbia were given a grade
of "F" for not meeting minimum standards required for developing programs designed to
prevent smoking and to assist smokers in their efforts at cessation. Marc Kaufman, Smoking-
Prevention Work CriiaZed in Most of U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at A13. In order to meet
the 2010 national objective of reducing the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the adult popula-
tion by twelve percent, tobacco control programs need to be implemented fully--not only as to
the initiation, but the cessation of smoking. CDC Report, supra note 66, at 752. Overall state
spending for fiscal years 2002-2004 on tobacco prevention and control programs declined
twenty-eight percent in the Uited States-with two states, Florida and Massachusetts, cutting
their programs by seventy-five percent. Id.
72. Fiore et al., supra note 71, at 208, 209.
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the establishment of a national network of smoking cessation quit lines acces-
sible twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week in every state, the District of
Columbia, and the federal territories;73 support for all clinicians to assure that
they have the skills and support systems necessary to assist them in helping
their patients quit tobacco use; 7 4 insurance reform to include tobacco treat-
ment coverage for FDS approved pharmacotherapy which, in turn, would
allow over-the-counter medications or vouchers for physician approved pre-
scription medication;75 and the creation of public/private partnership initia-
tives which, among other things, would engage not only health insurers, em-
ployers, schools, and even faith-based organizations in providing counseling
as part of dependence treatment benefit packages, but advance programs and
policies that seek to foster the motivation to quit among tobacco users.
7 6
The various components of the action plan are to be funded, essentially,
by a Smokers Health Fund derived as such from the proposed increase of the
Federal Excise Tax on cigarettes estimated to be at least fourteen billion dol-
lars (out of a total of twenty-eight billion dollars generated).77 By raising the
federal tax from thirty-nine cents to $2.39 a pack, it has been estimated that
three million premature deaths could be prevented and five million American
citizens would be assisted in their efforts to quit smoking within a year.
78
Interestingly, taxpayers having income less than $30,000 pay approxi-
mately fifty-three percent of the present cigarette tax-while "[o]nly one per-
cent is paid by those with incomes over $100,000." 79 Thus, a real argument
can be made against imposing additional federal or state taxes on cigarettes
because there would be a disproportionate penalty on the poor who, them-
selves, spend more of their modest incomes on tobacco than the rich.80
Apart from the issue of equity in the taxation of cigarettes, the potential
for success of this National Action Plan is in serious doubt for another rea-
son-this, because the Bush Administration has stated it has no plans to raise
the federal excise tax.81 Without the creation of a financial base through the
imposition of new taxes or other budget re-allocations, the National Action
Plan has little real chance to become operational.
73. Id. at 206.
74. Id. at 208.
75. Id. at 207.
76. Id. at 209.
77. Id. at 208.
78. Ceci Connolly, $2 Federal Cigarette Tax Hike Sought, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 2003, at A29.
79. Samuelson, supra note 3.
80. Id.
81. Ceci Connolly, $2 a Pack Increase in Tax on Cigarettes is Rejected, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27,
2003, at A25.
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C. International Responses: The European Union and the World Health
Organization
Even though the fifteen member countries of the European Union (EU)
provide almost one billion dollars a year to tobacco farmers as crop subsidies,
recent efforts to restrict smoking at local and state levels have seen the impo-
sition of laws that, among other things, make government buildings smoke
free as well as either impose complete bans in pubs and restaurants or create
non smoking zones.8 2 Other efforts have led to placing warnings on all ciga-
rette packs sold. There are also efforts seeking to ban cigarette advertising in
newspapers, on billboards, on the Internet, and at sporting events.
83 Addi-
tionally, tobacco manufacturers are required to reduce tar levels in their prod-
ucts and are no longer allowed to call cigarettes "light" or "mild."
84
Interestingly, while the United Nations does not have full legislative au-
thority to direct change in its member states, the European Union (EU) main-
tains a type of legislative supremacy over the national acts of its members by
issuing directive and regulations.8 5 Directives are binding, yet allow the mem-
bers considerable means to attain the end goals of these directives.
8 6 Con-
trariwise, regulations have the effect of law in each of the member states and
do not have the degrees of discretionary latitude for implementation that is
found in directives.8 7 The struggle to shape a tobacco policy that ensures not
only corporate accountability, but also protects individual liberty and asserts
the public health powers of the states far exceeds the membership of the EU
and is, indeed, transnational
8
While piecemeal tobacco control legislation has been enacted over the
last three to four decades by various members of the EU, it has been seen as
largely ineffective because of its failure to ban, uniformly, point-of-sale adver-
82. Noelle Knox, Europe Plays Catch-Up on Smoking Restrictions, USA TODAY, Dec. 24, 2003,
at 5A. See generally RODDY REID, GLOBALIZING TOBACCO CONTROL, 168-174 (2006); Daniel
Williams, Vesuvius Plugged: In Italy, Public Smoking Gets the Boot, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2005, at Cl;
John Daniszewski, Pub Smoking Bans Snuff out an Irish Traditon, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at 6A;
Beth Gardiner, Britain Proposed Curbs on Smoking, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2004, at A23. But see
Keith Johnson, Spain Keeps Ighting Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2006, at B1 (reporting on the
Spanish government's unsuccessful efforts to enforce a smoking ban in small bars and restau-
rants as well as large taverns and the efforts of tobacco companies to protect their market share
by lowering tobacco prices in order to meet increased government taxes on tobacco products).
83. Johnson, supra note 82.
84. Knox, supra note 82.
85. Christine P. Bump, Comment, Close But No Cigar: The WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Contrors Futile Ban on Tobacco Advertising 17 EMORY INT'L. L. REv. 1251, 1294 (2003).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. For a comparative analysis of this global struggle in Australia, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Japan and the Umted States, see UNFILTERED: CONFLICTS OVER TOBACCO
POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Eric A. Feldman & Ronald Bayer eds., 2004).
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tising for tobacco products.89 In order to address this very complicated issue
of "tobbaccous," the World Health Organization (WHO) began an initiative
in 1995 to draft a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control whose pur-
pose was to improve transnational tobacco control by showing how tobacco
is a significant contributor to health inequities in members of the world com-
munity and developing a comprehensive tobacco control strategy which could
be implemented.90 On May 21, 2003, the WHO announced that its Frame-
work Convention had been accepted by all of its 192 member states. 91 Wide-
spread ratification, however, will surely be more problematic.
The WHO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, is charged with
the responsibility for providing global leadership in implementing the United
Nations goals in transnational health. 92 Historically, nonenforceable guide-
lines and non-binding regulations have been the sole arsenal of the WHO.
93
While the WHO's Tobacco Convention makes a noble statement of pur-
pose, Article 13-considered to be the key provision on tobacco advertis-
ing-is defective, and its defectiveness is destructive of the whole instrument.
By failing to direct the suspension of point-of-sale retail tobacco advertising-
the central market focus of present industry efforts-the Convention be-
comes yet another shallow symbol of U. N. ineptitude.94 Instead of taking a
bold, forthright position, Article 13 only requires that parties to the Conven-
tion following their "own national constitution" proceed to take "legislative,
executive, administrative and/or other appropriate measures .... to restrict
89. Bump, supra note 85, at 1300, 1301. See Adam Sage, Paris Offers a Pipe of Peace to Les
Tabacs, THE LONDON TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at 21 (detailing the French government's plan to
freeze the taxes on cigarettes until 2008-this in a country where thirty-four percent smoke-
and where, with the exception of the United Kingdom, cigarettes are already more expensive;
with the French move being designed to mollify the smoking constituency). A recent report
submitted to the European Parliament showed conclusively that in the twenty-five countries
comprising the European Union, over 79,000 adults die as a result of passive smoking and the
report called for a legislative program to prevent smoking in all enclosed public areas-
including workplace environments, bars and restaurants. SMOKE FREE PARTNERSHIP: LIFTING
THE SMOKEsCREEN: 10 REASONS FOR A SMOKE FREE EUROPE-NEW REPORT ISSUED IN THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 141 (2006), available at
http://www.ersnet.org/ers/show/default.aspx?id-attach=13509.
90. World Health Organization, An International Treaty for Tobacco Control, Aug. 12,
2003, http://www/who.int/features/2003/08/en. See generally Allyn L. Taylor, An International
Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE L.J. INT'L L. 257 (1996).
91. Bump, supra note 85, at 1308, n.34. The Convention entered into force Feb. 27, 2005.
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/en/.
92. Taylor, supra note 90, at 279.
93. David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organizafion: What Role for International
Law, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1079, 1087 (1998) (discussing WHO's historical attitude
towards international law).
94. Bump, supra note 85, at 1309. See generally George P. Smith, II, The U.N. and the Envi-
ronment, n A WORLD WITHOUT A U.N. (Burton Y. Pines ed., 1984).
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tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship." 9
5 While a comprehensive
ban on all tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship is set out as one
such measure, its use is neither urged nor encouraged.
96
The WHO Draft Convention which entered into force as the world's
first tobacco control treaty on February 27, 2005, was signed by 168 nations
and will apply specifically, for the time being, in only the fifty-seven countries
which have ratified it.97 While countries such as Britain, Japan and Germany
have approved the treaty already, the Bush Administration-although approv-
ing the text in May, 2004-has not sent it to the Senate for ratification.
98
Although commendable in design and in its nobility of purpose, the
Convention's continuance of only partial tobacco advertising bans--directed
primarily to television and radio outlets-is its fatal weakness.
99 Indeed, until
the transnational community is of one mind in combating the health issues of
tobacco production and use, the Framework Convention will remain but a
framework-one lacking a firm foundation for implementation.
II. COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO ABATEMENT
A. The Law of Nuisance
At various times, a number of legal theories have been advanced to abate
the effect of cigarette smoking and have included assault
0 0 and battery,'0'
95. Bump, supra note 85, at 1302, 1303. See also Fifty-Sixth World Health Assembly, May
21, 2003, WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, art 12(2)-(4)(a), available
at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/en/.
96. Marc Kaufman, Global Tobacco Control Pact Takes Effect, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005, at
A10.
97. Id.
98. Id. See also Toby Helm, No Smoking-Even Outside the Office, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June
21, 2006, at 1 (discussing how Britain's new smoking law to take effect in June 2007, which
outlaws smoking in all pubs, restaurants, private clubs, and enclosed work areas, is providing a
base of expectation for subsequent legislation outlawing smoking in open spaces or wherever
there is a health risk posed from secondhand smoke); Kaufman, supra note 71.
99. Bump, supra note 85, at 1304. Largely because the United States opposed a blanket
advertising ban, the final treaty provides for nations having commercial free speech protections
to opt out of that provision. Kaufman, supra note 96; see also Benjamin Mason Meier, Breathing
Life into the Framework Convention on Tobacco Contro" Smoking Cessation and the Right to Health, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y & ETHICS 137, 189-90 (2005) (discussing another weakness of the Con-
vention: its failure to include any consideration of those addicted to nicotine and calling for a
separate protocol for the treatment of tobacco dependence in order to deal with this omission).
100. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5 10 (5th
ed.1984).
101. Id. at 5 9; Ezra, supra note 3, at 1085-86 (proposing a new civil action for smoker bat-
tery and acknowledging the inherent problems with its enforcement); see also Renee Vintzel
Loridas, Secondary Smoke as a Baftegy, 46 A.L.R. 5th 813 §5 2, 3 (1997).
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negligence and product liability,102 intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, 10 3 and punitive damages. 104 Although actions in nuisance'05 and tres-
pass 10 6 were actionable only for offenses affecting land interests, 07 the flexibil-
ity within the standard of reasonable conduct that is tested in any claim of
private or public nuisance, provides the very lynchpin for developing a fair
strategy to combat smoking. When this principle is codified, legislatively, into
local or state regulatory schemes designated to protect the public health, its
decisiveness and relevance will be apparent.
The capacity for individual self-control is obviously limited-particularly
with the addictive powers of nicotine at work in tobacco products. 10 8 It has
remained for the common law to determine when conduct, in the course of
life activities, is so unreasonable and offensive that transgressions of it subject
the offender to legal liability. 09 The extent to which legal liability is imposed
for offensive conduct is set, first, and perhaps foremost, by prevailing moral
standards which are translated subsequently into objective legal ones.110 This
process of evolution or translation not only allows the law to be able to grow
and adopt new principles for modern life, but retain those with historical rele-
vance"' as it in turn responds to public policy and, indeed, is shaped by it.112
While the vagaries of public policy change with the times, and in turn
cast new interpretative directions for the Common Law, many of the Nation's
central values remain immutable in their economic and moral soundings-
especially so with the law of torts; for, the simple and direct rationale for tort
law is to "shift the burden of loss from the victim to the person or entity that
102. Ezra, supra note 3, at 1072-73; see generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 100, at 5 96;
Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 893 (1998); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous
Products and Injured Bystanders, 81 KY. L.J. 687 (1993); Cochran, supra note 13, at 702 (arguing that
a strict liability be imposed on hedonic product liability for manufacturing alcohol and tobacco).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 (1965); Ezra, supra note 3, at 1083.
104. Ezra, supra note 3, at 1085.
105. Id. at 1081-82. See generaly RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§3.8,
13.5 (6th ed. 2003).
106. KEETON ETAL., supra note 100, at § 13.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1965); see generally 2 DOBBS LAW OF
REMEDIES §§ 5, 6 (Dan B. Dobbs ed., 2d ed. 1993).
108. Glenn Frankel, Decades After Declaration, War on Smoking Begins, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
1996, at Al (observing that the 1964 Report of the Surgeon General, Luther L. Terry, deter-
mined cigarette smoking is a health hazard and an acknowledged addiction). See also Bruce B.
Cohen, Killer Smoke, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at A17 (acknowledging that many smokers are
addicted while others choose to smoke recognizing fully the long term consequences of it).
As Robert C. Ellickson has observed," .. . virtually all of us have some capacity for
self-control." Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1187. See generaly Thaddeus Mason Paige, Balancang
Public Health Against Individual Libery. The Ethics of Smoking Regulation, 61 PiTT. L. REV. 419, 442
(2000).
109. Seegeneraly OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,JR., THE COMMON LAw (1923).
110. Id. at 38.
111. Id. at 36.
112. Id. at 35, 36.
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has unreasonably caused the loss.... ." and by so doing deter "other potential
harm doers from engaging in activity that would likely harm others in the
same fashion."
113
Both moral and economic vectors of force are thus clearly at work here
in tandem and, indeed, may be seen as complementary in that the social order-
ing expects all members of society to not only behave reasonably in their rela-
tions with one another but to act rationally by maximizing economic effi-
ciency in their property transactions.' 14 What is reasonable is, inherently,
"bound up in an organic sense of custom, community, and individual respon-
sibility."' 115 Economics, as the other pillar of tort law, according to Richard A.
Posner "subsumes the moral basis for tort law," and because "we do not like
to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable over-
tones of moral disapproval."" 6 It is all within the crucible of the Common
Law of Nuisance where the richness of tort law is given full play, that the cata-
lyst for dealing with the public health hazard of tobacco is to be found."
7
Some anti-smoking forces expect that over time, when the prices for
packs of cigarettes rise significantly, smoking tastes will be curbed." 8 Others
expect new smokeless or low-smoke cigarettes will go far to sooth public
health concerns about smoking and passive smoking in particular." 9
B. Shaping a Template for Decisionmaking- Issues of Indeterminancy
When asked to decide whether a challenged use of property constitutes a
nuisance, then, two types of judicial considerations are made: one, "a utilitar-
ian calculus of the relative social values of the conflicting activities" in issue,
113. Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promise and Pzufals, 3 N.Y.U. ENVT'L. L.J. 255,
266 (1994).
114. Id. at 266-67. Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaimng Environmental Law: A Normative Critique
of Cotarative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 631 (1992) (suggesting that the very sub-
stance of contemporary environmental law is but a composite of moral decisions and those
decisions which best achieve "morally based goals.").
115. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of The Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, in
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw 44, 46 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 3d ed. 1990).
116. Richard L. Posner, A Theoy of Negligence, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 14, 18 (3d ed.
1990).
117. See generally DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMIc ANALYsts OF TORT
LAw (1992).
118. Cigarette Prices Rise Shatpy in 'ake of States' Tobacco Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
1998, at A5. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulations, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174 (1998) (observing that the
clear trend in regulation has been toward incentive-based or market-based systems).
119. See Melanie Wells, RJR Takes Smokeless Test, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997, at lB. But see
Gordon Fairclough, A Potentially Less Toxic Cigarette Gets Natural Push, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001,
at 1 (detailing the concerns of some anti-tobacco activists that the "new" cigarettes will discour-
age smokers from quitting because of the lowered toxicity).
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and two, a "justice-oriented evaluation" of what serves as both a fair distribu-
tion of the benefits as well as the burdens of the land ownership in issue.
120
Consequently, when property disputes are resolved ultimately, they are
done so by reference to human values; or, in other words, a normative frame-
work which allows choice between freedom and security. 121 Yet, the values
implicit in choices among property rules are always in conflict as well as vari-
ous in number and, indeed, incommensurable-resulting invariably in a vexa-
tious conundrum: namely, how to effect a true comparison of the value of
freedom and the value of security and make a choice of one over the other?
Joseph W. Singer holds to the opinion that the nuisance doctrine's goal
of resolving land use conflicts by assessing "the reasonableness of one
owner's land use in light of the harm it causes to others" is a "nonresolu-
tion"-this, because a judgment of some kind, as observed, is required.
22
Three choices are available: a balance of the interests of the concerned parties,
a consideration of the overriding interests of the community, or a moral
judgment made regarding which particular uses are to be favored.
123
In any case, this solution to land use conflicts requires the exercise of
judgment. It answers the dilemma by restating the problem. In so doing, it
forces us to attempt to articulate the considerations of justice or utility that
prompt us to want to rule in favor of freedom or security in particular cases or
classes of cases. It calls for us to make a judgement and forces us to explain
the factors that lead us one way or the other. It forces us to face the tension
within the concept of property and within the legal institution of property
head on, without flinching or turning away.
124
Inasmuch as nuisance law seeks to resolve land use conflicts, then, by
mandating the judicial decision maker to evaluate ultimate normative bases for
property use-or, in other words, justice and social welfare-and then apply
these norms to the facts of each case, the indeterminancy of this standard for
decisionmaking is clear since it defines a specific framework for conflict reso-
lution that simply cannot be applied in a forthright manner. Instead, subjec-
tive judgments-of necessity-must be made, thus defying the development
of precedent to be incorporated into a type of equitable policy making or stare
decisis. This, in turn, contributes to a very serious obstacle to the process of
nuisance decision-making-namely, an unavoidable drift which is referred to
as result oriented jurisprudence which in turn has been characterized as the
"deepest problem of our constitutionalism.'
125
120. JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 35 (2000).




125. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12
(1959).
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This classic concern arising over indeterminancy is reformulated, mod-
ernly, into what may be characterized as "Oprahizing" the law. Under the
jurisprudence of Oprah Winfrey, herself, a popular, nationally syndicated tele-
vision talk-show hostess, subjective feelings are embraced and elevated judi-
cially in order to promote desired outcomes grounded in abstract and abstruse
obligations severed, as such, from prior case precedents.
126
Admittedly, the Restatement of Torts balancing test seeks to establish a
process for decisionmaking which, facially, is commendable. 127 The inherent
weakness in the test itself, however, is seen in its very fluidity and flexibility
and, thus, its absence of an a priori legal standard which adds to its difficulty
in being operational. Others would, however, suggest that the test is effica-
cious and practical because it is guided and shaped by the standard of eco-
nomic efficiency or reasonableness. Even though situational or fact-sensitive,




The courts have classified nuisance as either being per se, within itself, or
per accidens. Within the first classification are found a variety of immoral
activities (e.g., houses of prostitution) or practices of an extra hazardous na-
ture which jeopardize public health, safety, and welfare. A nuisance per se,
then, is one under circumstances at all times-regardless of location.129 Con-
trariwise, nuisances per accidens, or those in fact, are taken to be those acts
which have become unreasonable by reasons of circumstances and of sur-
roundings.13 0 Accordingly, for an action to be sustained this situation, a court
must find that the facts, as proved, with respect to location, harm and other
circumstances, establish a pattern of unreasonable conduct which must be
abated."
1
A private nuisance may be seen as an act or actions which interfere, un-
reasonably, with the use and enjoyment of another's use and enjoyment of
land. Normally, it affects but a limited number of landowners-and usually
concerns disputes between adjoining landowners. Public nuisance includes a
number of activities which interfere with comfort, moral standards, health,
126. Ronald Krotosynski, An Epitaphios for Neutral Pnnciples in Conslitutional Law: Bush v.
Gore and The EmergingJuniprudence of Oprah, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2093 (2002). See generally Robert
Walker, Anointed by Oprah, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 2004, at 36 (discussing the effect of
celebrity endorsements-termed the Oprah Effect--on their successful marketing).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 936 (1965) (Factors in Determining Appropri-
ateness of Injunctions). See generally 55 933-51.
128. See generally Srmth, supra note 40, at 726.
129. MORTON GITELAN ET AL., LAND USE: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (6th ed. 2004).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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safety, and convenience of the community.132 A public nuisance is more gen-
eral in scope and definition and includes "unreasonable interference with ...
rights common to the general public."'
133
The typical remedy for a public nuisance is found within the power of
public officials (for example mayor, municipal, or county attorney) to seek
abatement orders of the offending conduct or the imposition of criminal pen-
alties, usually of a modest nature. Under the doctrine of public nuisance, rec-
ognition is given to not only "the value of the annoying conduct to its spon-
sor" but equally to the corresponding "magnitude of the harm to the public"
resulting from the conduct.
134
D. Modern Approaches
In the United Kingdom, within the last one hundred years, the area re-
garded as traditional within the jurisdictional province of public nuisance has
been replaced by statute.135 Consequently, today only two situations give rise
to prosecutions for public nuisance: those where a "defendant's behavior
amounts to a statutory offense" for which a nominal penalty is imposed and
those where, although a defendant's behavior is not criminal, a local prosecu-
tor is unable to find any other basis for imposing liability.
136
Because of this contemporary practice, and the recognition by some that
"nuisance is merely a subset of negligence,"'137 sentiment has been expressed
for not only abolishing the crime of public nuisance-and thus recasting it by
statute as applicable only to behavior creating a threat to either public safety
or health-but restricting, as well, private nuisance actions to protection of
property from non-physical damage such as noxious fumes and noise. 138 Both
the goal and the practical effect of these re-alignments would be to enhance
and protect the environment from degradation by pollution.
139
132. Los Rachos de Albuquerque v. Albuquerque, 889 P.2d 185, 192 (1994). See generally
GITELMAN ET AL., supra note 129, at 32-37; Conor Gearty, The Place of Private Nuisance in a Mod-
em Law of Torts, 48 CAMB. L.J. 214 (1989).
133. Charles J. Doane, Comment, Beyond Fear: Articulating A Modern Doctrine in Antrcipato!,
Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L. REv. 441,
450 (1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1965). See generally J.R.
Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Citical Examination, 48 CAMB. L.J. 55 (1989) (examining the history
and the breadth of public nuisance).
134. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1185.
135. Spencer, supra note 133, at 65, 76.
136. Id. at 777.
137. Gearty, supra note 132, at 215.
138. Id. at 242.
139. Id.; Spencer, supra note 133, at 84. See also Gerry Cross, Does Only the Careless Polluter
Pay? A Fresh Examination of The Nature of Private Nuisance, 111 L.Q. REv. 445 (1995) (finding the
tort of nuisance is one of strict liability with liability therefore attaching by virtue of occupancy
and not of fault-with the taking of reasonable care providing no defense to such an action).
274 11 MSU JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND LAW 251 (2007)
III. THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY NUISANCE
A. Uncertainties in Application
Quite simply, as the term implies, an action for injunctive relief sounding
in a theory of anticipatory nuisance, is one brought before the unreasonable use
resulting in an actual nuisance has occurred.14° Seldom used as a common law
action,14' the doctrine entrusts the courts with "[t]he power to interfere by
injunction to restrain a party from so using his own property as to destroy or
materially prejudice the rights of his neighbor ... ."142 The central issue, then,
for a court responding to a case based on anticipatory nuisance is both shap-
ing the standard of immense severity a moving party must establish before
issuing the injunction and then applying it to the facts of the instant case. 43
Never characterized as inert, the common law holds great promise as a
finely-tuned mechanism for attacking the problems of secondhand smoke-
and especially so with refined applications of the doctrine of anticipatory nui-
sance.144 "Society has repeatedly been confronted with new inventions and
products that, through foreseen and unforseen events, have imposed danger
upon society ... . The courts have reacted by expanding the common law to
meet [such challenges]."' 145 A court armed with the doctrine of anticipatory
nuisance aiming to contain on the street smoking and smoking's irreversible
effects, is capable of preventing the adverse, latent effects' 46 cigarette smoking
involuntarily imposes upon innocent citizens.
Today, in England, balancing the interests of the plaintiff and defendant is of less
importance to the courts than a more focused analysis of "the type of harm that is required m
order to have an action, together with either the type of activity that attracts strict liability or (if
there is no strict liability) the conduct that attracts fault-based liability." Maria Lee, What Is
Private Nuisance?, 119 L.Q. REV. 298, 299 (2003). Conduct is only important when a defendant's
activity fails to "attract strict liability." Id. at 300, 301. Because of the indeterminate language
of reasonableness, then, private nuisance has been termed a "vulnerable tort" which may well
be absorbed by a reformulated tort of strict liability. Id. at 325.
140. George P. Smith, II, Re-validating The Doctrine of Aiiicipatogy Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 1
(2005). See generally Andrew H. Sharp, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitaing the Anticipatogy Nui-
sance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1988).
141. Sharp, supra note 140, at 627.
142. Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 125 (1873).
143. Sharp, supra note 140, at 632.
144. See generally Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Pubic Nuisance:
A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years after Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359 (1990) (citing 1
WILLIAM H. RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 24, at 48 (1986)).
145. See State v. Schnectady Chemicals, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 977 (1983) (citing Spano v.
Perini Corp., 250 N.Ed.2d 31, (1969)).
146. Gregory L. Ash, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an Increased Risk Cause of
Action, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1990).
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B. Judicial Passivity
The feature most attractive and unique to an injunction awarded on the
basis of an anticipatory nuisance 47 claim is its capacity to prevent future
harm. 48 The environment or individuals, themselves, may sustain irreversible
injury at the hands of technological advancement, economic progress in gen-
eral, or individuals' uncensored utilization of land.
The use of the anticipatory nuisance action by citizens desiring to block
the prevention of environmental harms before they occur has a simple and
direct goal: stopping both construction and operation of an industrial opera-
tion (for example, a solid waste disposal facility) before an irreparable injury
occurs. 149 Seemingly, a court should be commended for engaging in such
perceptive forethought, electing to utilize the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance
as, too often, the implementation of a post-injury remedial action proves
plainly outrageous to the preservation of society's health, welfare, and safety
concerns. 150 In those instances, hindsight amounts to exactly that-just hind-
sight and nothing more.
The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance has also been used creatively in
order to enjoin the use of derelict or abandoned houses from becoming crack
havens, 151 to prevent street gang members from gathering in public places and
thus becoming public nuisances 152 and to require, through mandatory injunc-
tive powers, the release of relevant information necessary to protect the
147. Two variations of anticipatory nuisance, nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens,
with divergent standards for qualification, have been recognized. A nuisance per se, as seen,
occurs when the thing complained of, the activity, structure, or function of the structure would
amount to a nuisance under all circumstances and at any conceivable time invariably undaunted
by locality or positioning. See, e.g., Wallace v. Andersonville Docks, 489 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn.
App. 1972); Cherokee Hills Util. Dist. v. Stanley, 1989 WL 61322 (Tenn. App. 1989); Brammer
v. Hous. Auth. of Birmingham 195 So. 256, 259 (Ala. 1940) (requiring that injury equate with "a
natural or inevitable consequence"); Leatherby v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 347 A.2d 826, 832 (Md.
1975). A nuisance per accidens, or nuisances in fact, becomes nuisance dependant upon sur-
rounding circumstances, the act itself and its propensity to create danger. See, e.g., Cunningham
v. Feezell, 400 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (1966). See GITELMAN ETAL., supra note 129.
148. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 100. Doane, supra note 133, at 449 (describing
an anticipatory nuisance as a "'vehicle" for the prevention of irreversible harm).
149. Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatogy Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law Theoy of Use in
EnvironmentalJusice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVT'L. L. & POL'Y REv. 223, at 249-50 (citing Mar-
garet Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (1995)). See
also Annotations, Rights to Enjoin Threatened or Antidpated Nuisance, 55 A.L.R. 880 (1928); 32
A.L.R. 724 (1924); 26 A.L.R. 937 (1923); 7 A.L.R. 749 (1920).
150. Doane, supra note 133, at 456-57.
151. See John W. Fountain, Old Law Used in New Attack on Crack Houses: Neighbors, Lawyers
Document Nuisance, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at B3.
152. William Booth, Los Angeles Sues for Peace; Court Asked to Bar Gang's Essence-Hanging Out
Together, WASH. POST, July 3, 1997, at Al. See generally Suzanne G. Lieberman, Drug Deahng and
Street Gangs-The New Nuisances: Modernizjng Theories and Bringing Neighbors Together in the War
Against Crime, 50 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 235 (1996).
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community from released sex offenders-this, in anticipating fear of acts of
recidivism.
5 3
Only two states-Alabama 54 and Georgia155-have enacted specific leg-
islation which allows the issuance of injunctive relief "to restrain the nuisance
before it is completed." Interestingly, in Pennsylvania, the boards of health
within each municipality are empowered "to abate or prevent a public nui-
sance or anticipated public nuisance."'
1 56
Inasmuch as the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance has the potential,
through application, to secure a liveable controlled environment, at first
glance it resembles a backyard bugzapper's incandescent light's attractiveness
to an eager moth with tunnel vision. Yet, the shortcomings of the doctrine
limit its ready application to prevent injury from occurring. One such weak-
ness is the doctrine's requirement of certainty and immediacy of harm which,
in turn, has the effect of risking the unknown because it prefers economic
investment rather than impeding progress. 157 The court, for example, in Holke
v. Herman,158 indicated that it would opt not to impede progress if the com-
plainant could overcome three imposing obstacles: "[1] the uncertainty of
future events, [2] the frequency of groundless alarms and [3] the despotism of
needlessly preventing a citizen from using his property.' 5 9 The complainant's
likelihood of satisfying this burden and other comparably rigorous burdens
used routinely by courts in adjudicating whether to issue an injunction is im-
probable. The occurrence or non-occurrence of a harmful future happening
is rarely ever presentable as an absolute in an evidentiary proceeding prior to
inception. 60 Simply put, the future is unpredictable. Therein lies the faulty
reasoning of courts imposing overly-rigorous standards, bordering on the
absolute, prior to granting injunctions based on anticipatory nuisance. 161
Surely, injunctions should not be granted for prospective harms blan-
keily without considering economic progress. The preservation of landown-
ers' and citizens' health should be balanced against economic progress and its
153. Megan's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (West 1996) (amending part of the Violent Crime
Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
154. ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1995).
155. GA. CODE ANN., 5 41-2-4 (West 2006).
156. See 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2199.1 (West 2006); 53 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. 5 37324
(West 2006). See generally Annotation, Injunction Agatnst Nuisance to Health and Comfort as Remedy of
Tenant Against Stranger, 12 A.L.R.2d 1229 (1950).
157. Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125, 135 (1990).
158. Id. at 125.
159. Id. at 134.
160. Andrew H. Sharp acknowledges that there exists a presumption in equity that an en-
deavor will be conducted in a non-offensive posture. Sharp, supra note 140, at 637.
161. Id. at 641. "Courts should not ignore a moderate risk of catastrophic or widespread
harm merely because it is not highly probable that such harm would result." Id. at 652; see also
Doane, supra note 133, at 472 (recommending a balancing of two considerations: the probability
and the magnitude of the injury).
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bounty. 162 Often, there is a refusal to recognize perhaps the "great possibility"
of the occurrence of a nuisance is deserving of an injunction, this given the
justification for awarding an injunction in the first place is to prevent the con-
ception of irreversible harm.163 In this regard, it is highly unlikely the judiciary
will overcome its disdain that laces the doctrine requiring a court to rule that a
proposed use of land is harmful prior to its occurrence and permit the doc-
trine of anticipatory nuisance to exert its full stopping power in the direction
of future harms. The judiciary has not yet acknowledged an anticipated nui-
sance measured as doubtful, contingent, or conjectural, regardless of whether
it utilizes the nuisance per se standard or nuisance per accidens standard.
164
Secondly, judges define the concept of anticipatory nuisance in non-
specific, relaxed terminology.165 This lack of specificity further discourages
individuals from petitioning courts for injunctions in reaction to a threatening
nuisance because of the lack of predictability with which courts consider the
factors they themselves elicit in the decision-making process. Judges not only
vary inconsistently in determining whether to invoke a nuisance per se or per
accidens standard, but inject arbitrarily into the traditional definition of antici-
patory nuisance qualifying terms to, in an errant attempt, clear the air so to
speak on the applicability of the doctrine. 66 This selection of words intended
to clarify the reaches of the doctrine has befuddled potential litigants attempt-
ing to discern whether or not a particular threatening nuisance satisfies the
requirements of the definition. 67 Generally, it can be seen that there is a wide
judicial agreement to disagree on a consistent, comprehensible formula for
solving anticipated land disputes. Unfortunately, this confusion discourages
individuals from resolving impeding future harm regardless of the existence of
an appropriate factual setting encouraging those individuals to approach cau-
tiously the use of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance subduing the doctrine's
potential advantages. The more discouraged potential litigants become, due to
the bleak prospects courts develop, the more frequently individuals will be
subjected to less than ideal predicaments unnecessarily. Despite the some-
times overwhelming obstacles an anticipatory nuisance action is confronted
with, complainants must continue to seek injunctions based on the doctrine
due to the irreversible harms that may ensue if allowed to come to fruition
uncontested.
Admirable causes such as the containment of the irreversible effects
cigarette smoke on involuntary, secondhand smokers is a perfect example of
imminent danger that should not persist uncontested. The doctrine of antici-
162. See Patrick M. McFadden, The Balanang Test, 29 B.C. L. REv. 585, 597 (1988).
163. Wilsonville v. SCA Services, 426 N.E.2d 824, 842 (1981).
164. See Williams, supra note 149, at 243.
165. Doane, supra note 133, at 453. (showing that state statutes and case law fail to show a
uniform, clear cut standard for plaintiffs attempting to enjoin threatening nusances).
166. Sharp, supra note 140, at 642-43; Doane, supra note 133, at 453.
167. Williams, supra note 149, at 249.
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patory nuisance is adept at securing a controlled environment regarding the
unrestricted emission of harmful and offense containment. The result of
regular subjection to secondhand smoke is more than mere conjecture or un-
founded fear. A public space saturated with secondhand smoke qualifies eas-
ily as a nuisance per accidens. It embodies an exact set of circumstances that
courts utilize the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance to enjoin. The facts and
circumstances-the unpleasant inhalation of large quantities cigarette smoke,
considered in conjunction with the particular location, a well-populated, pub-
lic gathering space-amounts to a nuisance per accidens. Physical harm is
certain to result from extensive exposure to secondhand smoke. A balancing
of the interests, 68 the social utility of a citizen's right to smoke cigarettes in
public places weighed against the gravity of physical harm committed upon
secondhand smokers, serious illness and possible resultant death, favors liber-
ating non-smokers from subjection to harmful cigarettes smoke by way of a
permanent injunction. 16
C. Preservation of the Public Health and Safety
There is one other general rule of the law of anticipatory nuisance that
provides comfort for landowners and citizens disoriented by the thick of un-
certainty courts have created. Courts will enjoin activities, structures, or tech-
nological instruments that endanger the public health. 170 As a consequence of
the judiciary's unfortunate agreement to speak in non-specific terms, this gen-
eral rule eases that uncertainty which confronts litigants threatened by poten-
tial health hazards. 171 No individual committing such an offense upon inno-
cent citizens 172 or neighboring landowners can shelter himself from liability
168. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 822 & cmts., 826 & cmts., 827, 828
(1965); Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Balance of Convenience or Social
Utiliy as Affecting Relief From Nuisance, 40 A.L.KR 3d 601 (1971).
169. Purver, supra note 168.
170. Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981) (granting an injunction to
prevent continued operation of a chemical waste disposal site due to eventual contamination of
the surrounding air, water and earth); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241, 248-49 (1901)
(granting an injunction preventing the discharge of sewers into the Mississippi river reasoning
that large quantities of the sewage would probably poison the water supply); Sharp v. 251st St.
Landfill, 925 P.2d 546, 548 (1996) (reasoning that the granting of the injunction was "an-
chored" on the probability that the water sources would be polluted by utilization of the land-
fill). Endangerment of the public health encompasses irreversible contamination of the envi-
ronment as the latter will affect the former inevitably in an adverse manner.
171. The predisposition of courts to protect individuals from public health hazards is not a
new phenomenon. From the time of Aldred's Case, courts have revisited time and again the
settled rule of this country that an individual is reserved the right to maintain a structure or
activity upon his own land which is regarded as dangerous, intolerable or uninhabitable to his
surrounding neighbor's well-being. Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 816. For an in depth analy-
sis of Aldred's case see Smith, supra note 40, at 682-686.
172. Abrams & Washington, supra note 144, at 364 (noting that a public nuisance is an
interference with or an intrusion upon a public right, not necessarily involving a restricted
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behind a belief in the sanctity of private property. 173 However, the public
health hazard or catastrophe that the land user will commit must result in a
serious grievance and not a frivolous or ultrasensitive complaint.174 Two cases
shed light on the level of seriousness courts require. The court, in Missouri v.
Illinois, provided qualification for the meaning of serious grievance and the
threshold that an intrusive activity, structure or instrument must cross to be
regarded as such. Often, the intrusion must affect a life source. 17 In this case,
the reality that the water supply was "indispensable to the life and health and
business of many thousands of inhabitants in the State of Missouri" was em-
phasized. 76 Similarly, the case of Sharp v. 251st Street Landfill announced that
the anticipated nuisance must be "a matter of publicjuris and of immediate,
local, national and international concern."'1 77 The obvious justification for
prohibiting activity responsible for consequences of this magnitude is that
often it is difficult to remediate completely pollution to water supply, for ex-
ample, once it occurs.178 The judiciary, however, does not make the determi-
nation of the certainty of irreversible contamination or damaging health con-
sequences independently. 179 Wisely, expert testimony is relied upon heavily
enjoyment of private property; a public nuisance has a strong relationship to public health and
safety); Jim Griffith, Comment, Government Defendants in Nuisance Injunction Suits, 6 COLUM. J.
ENVT'L L. 63, 69 (1979-80) ("A public nuisance action seeks to prevent unreasonable infringe-
ment on the rights of the general public. The protected interests are common to the public and
are in fact defined by that commonness.").
173. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522 (1897) (acknowledging the general
proposition that "a man may do what he will with his own," and holding that this right is sub-
ordinate to Sic utere tno ut alienum non das and thus-determined no fence could be erected
which enclosed 20,000 acres of public lands for pasturage purposes and large reservoirs for
water built to irrigate these lands).
174. Prauner v. Battle Creek Cooperative Creamery, 113 N.W.2d 518, 522 (1962). In Prau-
ner, the court denied the injunction reasoning that despite the serious danger that could occur,
the assumption that a petroleum storage facility would be operated safely was well-warranted.
Emphasizing the carefulness with which the facility would be operated, the court discredited
the argument that an individual would ever sustain a serious injury as a result of such operating
standards. Id.
175. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, at 210 (1901).
176. Id. The court's decision was further induced by the possibility of contagious diseases
being introduced into the river courtesy of the landfill and spreading throughout the niver
commumties of the state.
177. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 925 P.2d 546, at 552 (1996) (justifying the intrusions
as a matter of publici juris reasoning that "no commodity affects and concerns the citizens of
Oklahoma more than fresh groundwater.') (citing Dulaney v. Okla. State Dept. of Health, 868
P.2d 676, 684 (Okla. 1993)).
178. The Sharp court maintained that the "difficulty, complexity and costliness of remedy-
ing groundwater contamination was well documented and that once serious contaminated
groundwater is often rendered unusable and cleaning it up is often unsuccessful." Sharp, 925
P.2d at 555 n.12.
179. Id. at 555 (relying on expert testimony to assist in the decisionmaking process that
determines the permanence of harmful acts).
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when efforts are undertaken to decipher effective and ineffective arguments
founded upon intricate scientific reasoning and complex understandings.' 80
A judicial determination that health consequences of a certain activity are
imminent and actual is essential to enjoining threatening nuisances. Subse-
quent to such a determination, an individual's right to non-interference takes
precedent over even economically advantageous endeavors. 181 In the absence
of such a determination, courts are reluctant to impede economic progress.
As evidenced by past plaintiffs' arguments, an under-reliance on adverse
health effects of an activity accompanied by a corresponding over-emphasis
on olfactory and aurally oriented nuisance concerns may assure the denial of
an injunction.182 A final determination is often fixated on the presence or
absence of the possibility of sustaining a physical injury of a serious nature.
183
In Roach v. Combined Uiliy Commission of Easly, for example, the complainant
noted initially the existence of a concern for health, yet, failed to promote it as
a chief argument in the case. 184 As a result, the injunction was denied.
185
Plaintiffs desiring injunctions must prove that the unwholesome activity, the
target of the enjoinment, threatens individuals' physical well-being to be as-
sured a substantial level of credence in their arguments positioned inoppor-
tunity against the current of economic progression. 186
Clearly, cigarette smoke in public gathering places endangers the public
health. 187 The public health hazard that smokers commit upon exercising
their offensive habits within public spaces is not a frivolous grievance. Clean
air is indispensable to the life of all individuals, and the effects of cigarette
contaminated air are irreversible. Non-smokers hold the trump card: the ar-
gument in favor of the preservation of their own health, welfare, and safety.
D. Recreational Uses of Public Space
While physical injury, illness, or the contamination of the environment
acts as a potential plaintiffs trump card, 188 a judicial recognition of the recrea-
tional value land represents to individuals provides sound public policy and
popular sentiment to bolster the granting of an injunction to prevent the in-
180. Id.
181. See Wilsonville v. SCA Services, 426 N.E.2d 824, at 835 (1981).
182. Roach v. Combined Util. Comm'n of Easley, 351 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1986).
183. See Fairview Township v. Schaeffer, 562 A.2d 989, 990 (1989). The Wilsonville court
considered smoke, dust, and odors to constitute an enjoinable nuisance only in conjuncuon
with a substantial physical injury. Village of Wilsonville, 426 N.E. 2d at 829.
184. Seegeneraly Roach, 351 S.E.2d at 168.
185. Id. at 439-40.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 16-17, 36-37 and accompanying text.
188. See Att'y Gen. v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361, 362 (1880) (showing
the inference that courts emphasize public health concerns over recreational use of public areas,
yet, in that recognition, the courts do not disregard completely the societal worth of recreational
outlets).
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ception of a threatening nuisance. 189 It is unlikely a counterposing activity
would be enjoined solely for its interference with the occupation of a public
area for enjoyment alone. To a degree, however, judicial recognition of the
appropriateness of land for recreational purposes surfaces chiefly when the
most beneficial uses of a public area coexist meritoriously. 190 Concern is ex-
pressed for the dominant surgence of a legitimate activity allowed to persist at
the expense of another equally legitimate utilization of a common gathering
place. 191 In those situations where an activity, instrument, or structure does
not promote necessary economic progress, the element of recreational enjoy-
ment holds persuasive appeal to courts. 192 Where the act does advance eco-
nomic progress, the efficacious character of an injunction based on a nuisance
threatening recreational practices when paired with a health hazard against a
legitimate act of considerable societal worth, may be enjoined justifiably.
Individuals utilize public space, such as parks, as recreational outlets
from urban lifestyles ritualistically. No more societal value attaches to the use
of these same public areas for "lighting up" than does recreating within them.
In fact, a case can be made that the ability to use and enjoy these public places
safely is a more meritorious use of the land. In combination with the adverse
health effects for which secondhand smoke is responsible, the ability to use
pedestrian thoroughfares, parks, outdoor malls, and sidewalk dining areas
smoke-free for entertainment purposes bolsters the case for the containment
of cigarette smoking, through the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, with the
potential to create a vast refuge from its harmful effects. 193
E. Location, Location, Location!
The utility, versatility, and popular demand for a particularly unique loca-
tion within a community setting is not uncommon when the location repre-
sents an epicenter of activity.194 Undoubtedly, opposing interests will conflict
over the right to occupy or use such a unique location. 195 Absent clashing
interests in an area frequented by the citizenry, the need to utilize the com-
mon law action of anticipatory nuisance would be nonexistent in such a con-
text. Courts microanalyze the geographic setting of which a dispute over land
189. Village of Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 830, 838 (pointing to the impairment of recreational
functions of a pond, but strongly supporting the injunction granted on the basis of a detriment
to the public health).
190. See, e.g., Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (the draining of a pond for the
improvement, not preservation of a supplemental water supply, was enjoined to preserve rec-
reational uses of the pond and avoid detriment to the public health).
191. West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158, 170-171 (1863).
192. Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Corp., 133 Mass. 361, 363 (1882).
193. See generally Elhckson, supra note 2.
194. Olsen v. Baton Rouge, 247 So. 2d 889, 894 (1971) (recognizing many uses of the area
and acknowledging that varying interests were dependent upon the area due to its accessibility).
195. Id. at 891-92.
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is the product. 196 The relative vicinity of one activity to the next, and the ca-
pability of one activity to hamper the existence of an opposing activity, often
decide the outcome of the dispute.
197
The activity, instrument, or structure a court deciphers as more crucial to
the operation of a community, in comparison to opposing interests, occupies
the location more convenient and suitable to its use.198 Other interests, more
intrusive than invaluable, are positioned strategically in available peripheral
locations so as not to impose upon the viability of that community. 199 Like-
wise, in the event that one particular activity may be affected solely in one
unparalleled locale within a community, that interest, if acknowledged as valu-
able to the maintenance of society, will acquire that precise positioning it re-
quires. 2
00
The decision of whether to enjoin a threatening nuisance is based upon
the physical properties of the land in the surrounding local. 201 Often the site
for the proposed nuisance is so alarming that a holding will provide an expla-
nation of the geography of the predicament prior to reporting any other facts
to the dispute. 20 2 On occasion, a judicial analysis turns solely on locale20 3 or
revisits the importance of the positioning of the act or structure frequently
throughout the opinion.20 4 The judiciary recognizes that in order to preserve
the health, wealth, welfare, and safety of the communities they preside over,
the exercising of location management is imperative. The dependence of a
considerable number of citizens upon a particular location, a specific physical
attribute of that location, or its surrounding area may persuade a court to en-
join a threatening nuisance.
20 5
196. Id.
197. See Goodfield v. Jamison, 544 N.E.2d 1229, 1229-30 (1989) (where the plaintiff prof-
fered an argument that a hog transfer station would retard commercial and residential growth in
the vicinity, however, the court declined to enjoin the construction of the station until the
plaintiff's "worst fears" were come true). See generaly Tal S. Grnblatt, Offenses to the Olfactory
Senses and the Law of Nuisance, 21 LEGAL MED. Q. 1 (1997).
198. Goodfield, 544 N.E.2d at 1229-30 (stating that the purpose of the transfer station was to
service local hog producers by servicing them as rapidly as possible).
199. Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 347 A.2d 826, 832 (1975) (holding that the quarry
was appropriately positioned in a rural area adjacent to farmland).
200. Olsen, 247 So. 2d at 891.
201. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 925 P. 2d 546, 555 (1996).
202. Fairview Twp. v. Schaefer, 562 A.2d 989, 990 (1989) (focusing not only on the posses-
sion of a tiger but defendant's maintenance of the tiger in a residential neighborhood).
203. Duff v. Morgantown Energy Assoc., 412 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1992) (stating that in testing
whether a particular use of real property constitutes a nuisance, the reasonableness or unrea-
sonableness of use in relation to the particular locality involved is of paramount consideration).
204. Fainview Tap., 562 A.2d at 989-90, 992 (1989) (revisiting the concern for caging exotic
wildlife in a residential area a number of times throughout its analysis); Wilsonville v. SCA
Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1981).
205. See, e.g., Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 238 (1971) (enjoining farmers' use of a particu-
lar pesticide because application would render part of Texas' river system unuseable for eleven
Texas municipalities).
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Locating a nuisance in a public gathering place, an epicenter of city life,
acts as further persuasive evidence in favor of regulating and designating
smoke zones and refusing to specify or contain smoke-free refuges. Public
areas are crucial to the smooth operation of an urban society. Therefore,
smoke zones should be situated in the periphery or the less traveled areas of a
community. The maintenance of society requires precise positioning of
smoke zones in lightly trafficked areas. The implications of opting to sanction
the existence of a harmful activity in a location susceptible to impurity must
be seriously considered. A potential litigant must exploit the value of preserv-
ing healthy environments in well-traveled or frequented locations pursuant to
the prospect of succeeding or providing an actionable threatening or anticipa-
tory nuisance.
IV. OPEN-ACCESS PUBLIC SPACE ZONES
In order to deal with chronic street nuisances defined as behavior that
violates---over a period of time--community norms governing proper con-
duct in particular public spaces that either create minor annoyances to
passersby or, alternatively, have the cumulative effect of annoying, Robert C.
Ellickson has proposed a scheme to divide urban public land spaces within
cities into zones thereby regulating levels of conduct within them.20 6 As with
typical traffic light colors of red, yellow and green, he suggests a red zone be
marked as utilizing five percent of city space, a yellow zone comprising ninety
percent and a green zone utilizing five percent.
In the red zone of the city's downtown area, a relaxed standard of con-
duct would be tolerated where sidewalk behaviors-otherwise considered
disorderly elsewhere (for example, public drunkenness, loud noise making)-
would be seen as not violating any rules of the road.20 7 Public decorum would
be more strict in the yellow zone than in the red zone for it is here that the
great majority of citizens would mix with one another. Chronic panhandling
would not be allowed in the yellow zone, but it would be allowed in the red
zone.20 8 Episodic panhandling and bench squatting would be permitted, how-
ever, in both the red and yellow zones (which encompasses ninety-five per-
206. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1184-85 ("A person perpetuates a chronic street nuisance by
persistently acting in a public space in a manner that violates prevailing community standards of
behavior, to the significant cumulative annoyance of persons of ordinary sensibility who use the
same spaces.").
207. Id. at 1220-21. But see Stephan R. Munzer, Ellickson on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban
Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters and Day Laborers, 32 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL
LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 14, 15 (1997) (maintaining Ellickson's tiered zoning system is flawed be-
cause it fails to account for various social dysfunctions which would be permitted within the
red zone).
208. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1220-21.
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cent of all downtown space).20 9 It is within the green zone where strict regula-
tions of disruptive behavior (for example, radio playing and other street nui-
sances) would be enforced so that pleasant environmental conditions would
allow a refuge, of sorts, for sensitive citizens such as the frail, elderly and chil-
dren of grade school age.
210
While cigarette and other forms of smoking, do not, as with episodic in-
cidents panhandling or bench squatting, necessarily create or give rise to a true
sense of urban disorder, severe aggravation may-and, indeed, often does-
arise when annoying and unhealthy secondhand smoke smothers hundreds of
pedestrians each hour as they use the public streets to conduct and advance
social and business pursuits.
21'
Public smoking, pan handling, bench squatting, street drunkenness, loud
"music" or radio noise played indiscriminately, sidewalk bicyclists and skate
board "artists" using the public by ways and thoroughfares discourage-
unquestionably-the same use of public spaces by ordinary, peaceable citi-
zens. If unable to experience pleasant conditions that do not aggravate in
town areas while shopping socially and transacting business activities, reloca-
tions by businesses and customers alike are made to other safer, more hospi-
table areas outside the inner city which, in turn, add to the decline of the vi-
brancy of the urban areas themselves.
212
Put simply, public spaces are incalculable community assets and cannot
be squandered on aggravating and noxious patterns of incivility which destroy
the peace of the streets. 213 The liberty interests of the offenders thus become
secondary to the majoritarian rights to communal enjoyment. While a liberal
society must guarantee, ideally, that the most humble have access to open
public spaces, 214 societies must impose for use of such space rules of the road.
209. Id. at 1222. See also Sanchez, supra note 29 (reporting on efforts by major U.S. cines-
notably San Francisco, Philadelphia, Santa Monica, and Santa Cruz-to restrict panhandling
areas and homeless shelters).
210. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1222. But see Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking
Regulation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 475, 488 (1991) (asserting that nuisance law is "a matter of thresh-
olds" and, consequently, intermittent disturbances that cigarette smoke, when non smokers are
subjected to it, falls well below the threshold point at which the general public deems behavior
noxious. As such, Rabin refuses to acknowledge Ellickson's chromc street nuisance theory and
thereby fails to accept the fact that while one isolated exposure to second hand smoke presents
infinitesimal harm to a street user, repetitious subjection to second hand smoke proves as of-
fensive as a factory that emits constantly an offensive odor. Indeed, coupled with substantiated
health risks, second hand smoke causes, the Rabin "threshold" is surpassable).
211. Elickson, sapra note 2, at 1177. See Doug Levy, Smokers Fight Back Against Local Cga-
rette Laws, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997, at 5D (discussing various innovations in anti smoking
strategies including smoking lounges in shopping malls and in airports).
212. William L. Mitchell, II, Secondary Effects Anayss: A Balanced Approach to the Problem of
Prohibitions on Aggressive Panhandling, 24 BALT. L. REv. 291, 295 (1995).
213. Robert Tier, Maintaining Safey and Civiity in Spaces: A ConstitutionalApproach to Aggressive
Begging, 54 LA. L. REv. 285, 289 (1993).
214. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1173.
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As such, these rules that set standards for proper behavior on the streets
should not be viewed as impediments to freedom, but rather, as foundations
for its perpetuation.215 Without reasonable codes for street conduct, social
control in urban areas will dissipate and the frequency of criminal activity will
increase or multiply correspondingly. 216 The central-most question becomes,
then, whether the so-called "minor" episodic street nuisance of tobacco
smoking is a part of contemporary American culture of the streets or whether
such conduct is a public health hazard that needs either to be regulated or be
banned totally as public nuisances. Each community needs to assess the ex-
tent to which it will validate the typical reactions of those exposed to second
hand tobacco smoke as "reasonable" and "culturally acceptable" when such
physical responses include "...burning, itching, and tearing eyes, sore throat
and hoarseness, persistent cough, blocked sinuses, headaches, nasal irritation,"
and allergic reactions such as "dizziness, nausea, blackouts, memory loss, dif-
ficulty in concentration, cold sweats, aches and pains, skin eruptions and even
vomiting.
' '217
Ellickson's public space zones are creative, but, because of the proven
health hazards of passive smoking, should be expanded to include smoking as
a chronic nuisance. As such, only within the red zone should it be tolerated
publicly-and, then, only in smoke rooms provided by the city and certainly
not in open areas such as public parks or the streets. Much as public rest-
rooms are provided by local governments and major downtown businesses,
contained public smoke rooms could be made available in the red zone for the
downtown shoppers, businessmen and other nicotine addicted pedestrians.
Here, such people could smoke until their heart's content without restrictions.
Ideally, smoking should only be done in the privacy of one's home and
receive very limited First Amendment protections. 218 As a practical matter,
however, tobacco smoking is such a part of the cultural milieu that it can
never be banned totally. Yet-if it can be prohibited in restaurants and office
buildings, why not the public streets? Accommodation of the smoking inter-
est groups could be done in the public smoke rooms. Already such rooms are
made available in major airports.
219
215. Id. at 1174.
216. See id. at 1171.
217. Ezra, supra note 3, at 1064.
218. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1229-31.
219. See Lois Romano, Isghtening Up: As Poliicians Weigh Tougher Tobacco Dead, Many Businesses
Make Room for Smokers, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1997, at Al (reporting on the variety of responses
taken by airports-such as those at Chicago O'Hare, Dallas/Fort Worth-in building smoking
rooms and outside shelter to accommodate smoking travelers, employees, and visitors, and the
city of Des Moines, Iowa, that went so far to build a 4,000 square foot smoking club in a down-
town mall called Puffs "where people pay 50 cents to duck in for a smoke or $1.25 for a day
pass").
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A. Governmental Responses
Since 1996, federal "agencies have spent at least $19.7 million dollars for
standard self-standing smoking shelters." 220  The Government Services Ad-
ministration (GSA) has determined that in the fiscal year 2000, at least $8.3
million dollars have been expended for these projects.221 The Defense De-
partment alone has, since 1996, spent at least $17.9 million dollars for the
construction of smoking shelters. 222 Typically, these shelters "resemble bus-
stop shelters with clear plastic walls, [and] range in price from $2,000 to
$20,000."223 Prompted in 1992 by the Environmental Protection Agency's
classification of environmental tobacco smoke as a Group A carcinogen
224
and President Clinton's August 9, 1997 Executive Order barring indoor smok-
ing in federal buildings, 225 the governmental agencies had had little choice




Even though the "privacy of the home" and, indeed, its "sanctity," are
imbedded in the early tradition of the American Republic 226 and guaranteed by
the "substantive rights of personhood, 227 contemporary concerns of public
health issues are modifying-if not compromising-these time-honored tradi-
tions. The central task, then, becomes one of balancing the rights of smokers
to pursue behavior patterns "whose pleasures and pains are mainly theirs '228
against the rights of nonsmokers to be free from proven health hazards asso-
ciated with passive smoking in their homes and places of work. Finding an
appropriate balance or accommodation of these two rights is the challenge for
a lawful, contemporary society.
Lipsman v. McPherson, a 1991 case decided by Middlesex County, Massa-
chusetts, appears to have been the first reported case brought by an apartment
dweller whose unit was polluted by a neighbor's smoke which seeped into the
220. Barbara J. Saffir, Agences' Fadlities for Smoking Range from Outdoors to CoVy, WASH. POST,
Dec. 27, 2001, at A21. See also Romano, supra note 226. See also Alex Witchel, Stealing a Smoke,
in Good Comany, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, at 5.
221. Saffir, supra note 220.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders, 62
Fed. Reg. 43,451, Exec. Order No. 13058 (Aug, 9, 1997).
225. Id.
226. TRIBE, supra note 5, 1412.
227. Id. at 1413.
228. Samuelson, supra note 3. Seegenerally Michele L. Tyler, Note, Blowing Smoke: Do Smokers
Have a Right? I miting the Privacy RZghts of Cigarette Smokers, 86 GEO. L. REv. 783 (1998).
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plaintiffs apartment and caused him not only annoyance and discomfort but
increased the risks of ultimate physical harm to him. 229 While the plaintiff did
not prevail, this case bore witness to numerous other similar cases-all liti-
gated with but modest success.
230
50-58 Gainsborough St. Realy Trust v. Haile carries the honor of being "the
first-ever written decision on the subject." 231 Decided in June 1998, a Boston
housing court judge determined that a landlord was liable for $4,350.00 in
damages for failing "to prevent smoke from a bar directly beneath [the plain-
tiff's] apartment from coming through the fireplace and the electrical out-
lets." 232 It was held that this condition breached the landlord's covenant of
quiet enjoyment made to the complaining tenant.
233
Breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the warranty of habitability,
the duty of care to maintain safe premises and-of course-nuisance, are the
principal weapons in a tenant's arsenal to combat unwanted tobacco smoking
in dwellings. 234 Essentially, all of these remedies involve proving the offend-
ing tenant and landlord are acting unreasonably by creating an unhealthy inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of a moving plaintiffs dwelling unit.
235
In Utah, by statutory enactment, "tobacco smoke that drifts into any
residential unit a person rents, leases, or owns, from another residential or
commercial unit ... in each of two or more consecutive seven-day period" is




233. Id. See also Dworkin v. Pally 638 N.E. 2d 636 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
An out-of-court settlement was reached in July 1998, in a case brought by the New
York City law firm ofWeil, Gatshal & Manges alleging that its landlord-managing the General
Motors Building where the law firm was located-had allowed smoke from another tenant's
twenty-eighth floor office to seep into the law firm's twenty-ninth floor which caused sickness
to its employees. The settlement required the landlord and its offending tenant to install addi-
tional ventilation in order to abate the air pollution. Hansen, supra note 229.
234. David B. Ezra, "Get Your Ashes out of My Li'vng Room!:" Controlling Tobacco Smoke in
Multi-Unit Residential Housing 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 135, 159 (arguing that it is legal for property
owners and housing managers to pass regulations that have the effect of prohibiting smoking m
residennal setmngs).
Interestingly, parental smoking within the home environment has even been consid-
ered a form of child abuse. See generally William F. Chunock, Translating Insights into Polig: No
Smoking Around Children: The Family Courts' Mandatogy Duo7 to Restrain Parents and Other Persons from
Smoking Around Children, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (2003); Carlos Clark, Comment, An Agument for
Considerng Parental Smoking in Child Abuse and Negligent Proceedings, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 225 (2002); Susan Anne Pressley, Mother Who Smoked Near Family Gets Jazl, WASH. POST,
Aug. 13, 2004, at B1 (discussing a contempt citation and ten day jail sentence given to a mother
who violated a court order restctng her smoking habits when custodial visits were being
granted to her children).
235. Ezra, supra note 234, at 154.
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defined as a nuisance. 236 Yet, if the lease or purchase agreement for the unit
acknowledges smoking is allowed in the other building units and may, thus,
drift into his unit, the signature of the renter, lessee or buyer to the acquisition
instrument serves as a waiver of any nuisance rights which might otherwise
accrue under the statute.
237
A co-op board in a 452 unit building near Lincoln Center, in New York
City, took a bold, first of a kind action in 2002, by setting a policy not only
prohibiting new buyers from smoking in their dwelling units, but also requir-
ing them to declare whether or not they are smokers-an admission which
"could lead to the rejection of their applications. '238 Concern was expressed
by the Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union that this
policy goes too far and regulates private behavior and thus has the effect of
discriminating in housing based on disability (since smoking is thought to be,
for some, an addictive condition).
239
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), together with similar laws in
the states, protect against discrimination among individuals with disabilities
and allows them 'reasonable accommodation' in places of public accommo-
dations. ' ' 24° While not protecting nonsmokers as a group, the ADA allows a
nonsmoker protection only when ETS limits, in a substantial way, major life
activities such as breathing and working.241
The addicted or heavy smoker would probably not qualify for ADA pro-
tection either.242 This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the law states
succinctly: "Nothing in this chapter will be construed to preclude the prohibi-
tion of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of employment
... or in places of public accommodation." 243
236. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-1(3)(a) (1998). See also Sarah E. Hill et al., Mortality Among
'Never Smokers" Living with Smokers: Two Cohort Studies, 1981-4 and 1996-9, 328 BRIT. MED. J.
988 (2004) (finding a consistency in the studies which conclude an enhanced mortality for
individuals never exposed to secondhand smoke at home from those in the home who
smoked).
237. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-1(8)(b) (1998). See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d., Nuisances § I
et. seq. (2002); 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 1 et. seq. (1998).
238. Dennis Hevesi, Co-op Board Bans Smoking in Apartments by New Owners, N.Y. TIMEs,
April 30, 2002, at B1.
239. Id.
In state court opinions evaluating ADA-like legislation, smoking addiction has not
been classified as a handicap. See Mark W. Pugsley, Note, Non-smoking Hiring Poicies: Examining
the Status of Smokers Under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 43 DuKE L.J. 1089,
1104 (1994).
240. Ezra, supra note 234, at 165. The text of the ADA can be found at 42 U.S.C. §
12201-02, 12189 (2006).
Public lail inmates are also entitled to smoke free living environments. See Caryle
Murphy, D.C JadJoins Trend, Bans Smoking by Inmates, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2004, at 3.
241. Ezra, supra note 234, at 166 (quoting Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 1997 WL
38137, at *6 (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 1997), affd 134 F.3d 1222 (4th Cir. 1998).
242. Id.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1995).
Cigarette Smoking as a Public Health Hazard 289
B. Workplaces
It is estimated that seventy percent of the U.S. workforce is now covered
by smoke free policies. 244 Recently, two more states-Idaho245 and Massa-
chusetts 246-enacted legislation prohibiting smoke in all workplaces.
One recent and very significant medical study on the effects of a six
month city ban on indoor smoking for workplaces and other public environ-
ments validates the positive effects of such bans on public health.247 This six
month study during 2002 of the population of Helena, Montana, numbering
68,140 residents, found the number of heart attack victims in the city de-
creased by forty percent during the time a city ordinance was in effect banning
indoor smoking.248 After a challenge to the law was sustained, and the law
was subsequently invalidated, the former level of myocardial infarctions
among the population returned.
249
C. Employment Discrimination?
In 1995, in the case of City of North Miami v. Kurt 250 the Florida Su-
preme Court held the state government had a valid constitutional right to
"discriminate" against those using tobacco within the workplace setting before
their employment. More specifically, it was held that, as a pre-condition of
employment, it was valid for the city to require all applicants to execute an
affidavit affirming that they had been free from tobacco use for twelve
months prior to their application. Since the ordinance was designed, specifi-
244. H.J. Cummins, Pleny of Fire over Smoking MINN. STAR TRm., July 10, 2004, at ID (re-
porting from census data for 2002 that 70.5% of all U.S. workers have smoke free work sites).
See also John Ratter, Tobacco War Hits Beaches in Calfornma, USA TODAY, June 21, 2004, at 3A. See
generally Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance without Enforcement,
in SMOKING PoLIcy: LAw, POLITICS AND CULTURE 69-70 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993) (referencing government restrictions impeding the right to smoke in
various places).
245. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5501 (2006).
246. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 (2004). The other states with similar legislative prohi-
bitions on workplace smoking are: California, CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (West 2007); Connecti-
cut CONN. GEN. STAT § 19a-342(b)(1) (2004); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tt. 16 5§ 2902-04
(2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.204 (West 2007); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-
103, -04 (2005); New York, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (McKinney 2005); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-10 (2005); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws 5§ 23-20.10-3 through 23-
20.10-4 (2006). See generaly David B. Ezra, "Get Off Your Butts": The Emplqyers' Right to Regulate
Employee Smoking, 60 TENN. L. REv. 905 (1993).
247. Richard P. Sargent, Robert M. Shepard & Stanton A. Glantz, Reduced Incidence ofAdmis-




250. 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 1995).
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cally, to reduce medical insurance costs and increase productivity,25' and these
goals represent a valid compelling state interest, it was held this validated the
regulation under the ordinance. Once hired, however, the court determined
the regulation was unenforceable. 2 2 Furthermore, regarding Kurtz's claim
that his right of privacy was abridged by the ordinance, the Court held such a
claim was warrantless because the ordinance did not "intrude into an aspect of
Kurtz's life in which she has a legitimate expectation of privacy... [because]
in today's society, smokers are constantly required to reveal whether they
smoke."
25 3
The city government of a small community of 19,000 in Florida, called
St. Cloud, determined on March 25, 2002 that any present or prospective mu-
nicipal employee having a nicotine habit will not be employed. 2 4 Relying on
the ruling in Kurtq and, at the same time expanding its reasoning, the St.
Cloud ordinance requires "new hires to submit to medical tests at manage-
ment's discretion to prove they aren't sneaking a smoke on the sly after
hours."255 Indeed, new employees in city government are required to "sign an
affidavit swearing they have been tobacco-free for 12 months." 256
Extending the reasoning of Kurti to include random medical testing is
both novel and controversial. It also captures and defines the central issue:
the extent to which "tobacco users have a federally protected constitutional
right to use tobacco, an activity that is currently legal, and maintain a job at
251. It was determined that, in 1981, the city spent as much as $4,611.00 per year over what
it incurs for nonsmoking employees. Id. at 1027.
252. Id. at 1028. See generaly Elizabeth B. Thompson, The Conslitutionao of an Off-Duty
Smoking Ban for Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REv 491, 493 n.14, 512-
15 (1990) (listing a number of municipalities which have banned police officers and fire fighters
from smoking). But see Lisa L. Frye, Comment, You've Come a Long Way, Smokers: North Carolina
Preserves the Employee's Rights to Smoke Off the Job in General Statutes Section 95-283, 71 N.C. L. REv.
1978 (1993).
Approximately twenty-five states have enacted legislation which prevents employers
from dismissing workers who smoke off duty. See Stephanie Armour & Julie Appleby, Off-duty
Behavior Can Affect Job, USA TODAY, June 13, 2005, at 4B. Yet, some companies are imposing a
health care premium surcharge on workers using tobacco products (for example Northwest
Airlines and General Mills Corp.) and others are refusing to provide health insurance if either
spouses or domestic partners have access to such tobacco products at work. Neal Gendler,
NWA Smokers Face Health Care Surcharge, MINN. STAR TRIB., Oct. 19, 2005, at 2D.
253. April Hunt & Susan Jacobson, Tobacco Users Need Not Apply, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Mar. 27, 2002, at Al.
Interestingly, a 1989 ruling by the Federal General Accounting Office requires the
government to cover the costs incurred by federal employees who participate in smoking cessa-
tion programs (e.g., treatments, classes, and counseling). See Mike Causey, Uncle Sam Wants You
to Quit Smoking, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1998, at B2.
254. Hunt & Jacobson, supra note 253.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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the same time. '25 7  Civil rights activists assert the right of privacy is being
abridged by ordinances of the nature as that passed in St. Cloud. 258  Others
maintain a balance must be struck between the rights to a healthy working
environment for all employees and the individual rights of certain tobacco
addicted employees to enjoy reasonable rights of behavioral privacy while
working.
25 9
VI. LOCAL ORDINANCES: THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO SMOKING
REGULATION
A. Early Beginnings
In 1993, Davis, California became the unquestioned leader in the van-
guard movement among local communities to restrict smoking.260 Designed
257. Matthew A. Swartz, Note, Snuffing out Tobacco: The Ciy of St. Cloud's Attempt to Ban
Tobacco Use in the Name of Healthcare Reform: Can Everything Be a Special Need?, 20 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 181, 195 (2003). But see Robert P. Hogan, Comment, Restaurants, Bars, and
Workplaces, Lend Me Your Air Smokeplace Laws as Private Property Exactions-The Undiscovered
Countrj for Nollan and Dollan?, 22 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (2005) (suggesting
smoke control legislative schemes have crossed the line from a legitimate exercise of the police
power to a compensable taking, which is consistent with the holdings in Nolan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)); Dollan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
258. Swartz, supra note 257, at 195. State employees in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, South Dakota, and West Virginia who smoke are either forced to pay a surcharge on
their health insurance premiums or given cash incentives to maintain health maintenance pro-
grams for themselves. Penelope Lemov, Wellness: Carrots and Sticks, GOVERNING MAG., Sept.
2005, at 68; Lisa Comwell, At Work, Smokers Hit Where It Hurts; More Firms Charge Higher Health
Premiums, HOUSE CHRON., Feb. 20, 2006, at 1. See also Eileen Ambrose, Some Companies Tgy to
Push Workers Toward Adoping Healthier I ifesyles, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 24, 2005, at 1. Interest-
ingly, the Franciscan Health System, Pierce County, and the City of Tacoma-all in Washing-
ton state-are deliberating whether they will employ people who smoke--even when such
actvity is pursued privately off the job. Kenneth P. Vogel, Lose the Cigs-or the Job?, WASH.
NEWS TRIB., Aug. 28, 2005, at 1.
259. See generally Alan Stephens, Annotation, Validatzon, Construcion and Applicaion of Non-
Smoking Regulations, 65 A.L.R.4th 1205 (1988); Carol J. Miller, Annotation, Right of Employee to
Injunction Preventing Employer from Exposing Employee to Tobacco Smoke in Workplace, 37 A.L.R4th
480 (1985). See also Bernard Wysocksi, Jr., Companies Get Tough with Smokers, Obese to Trim Costs,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 12, 2004, at Bi (detailing how major corporations such as Umon Pacific, have
eliminated the hiring of smokers-thus, in an effort to curtail their healthcare costs for those
employees who not only smoke but are obese and have chronic diseases); Randy Dotinga, Can
Boss Insist on Healthy Habits, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 11, 2006, at 15 (detailing the efforts
of a Michigan company, Weyco, to force their employees to improve their health and going so
far as to dismiss those who refuse to quit smoking).
260. Davis Cal. Mun. Code § 34.02.0 (1993), available at
http://www.city.davis.ca.us/com/citycode/chapter.cfm?chapter=34 [hereinafter Davis Ordi-
nance]. One ordinance that did exceed the resrctions imposed by Davis was that proposed
(and passed, but never implemented) by the Village of Friendship Heights, Chevy Chase, Mary-
land. See Press Release, Proposed Ordinance Restricting Use of Tobacco in Village of Friend-
ship Heights (Oct. 1996). This village, which has previously banned bullets and supported
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to not only "protect the health and welfare of Davis residents, employees and
visitors,"261 the City Council identified, implicitly, its new smoking law as an
anticipatory nuisance ordinance by using the justification for the enactment of
the reduction of the "annoyance to nonsmokers who preferred to be free of
environmental smoke."
262
Though couched mainly in terms of public health concerns,
263 it is obvi-
ous from the content of the Davis ordinance that the City Council had, as one
of its primary objectives, the elimination of a public nuisance. The preamble
to the ordinance only justifies secondarily the restrictions by pointing to the
annoyance cigarette smoke causes to nonsmokers (and then only in the con-
text of enjoying meals and travel smoke-free).2 64 The ordinance, however,
goes to great lengths to restrict smoking activities that could only cause an-
noyance, and not health concerns, to others.2 65 One can only speculate that
the City Council believed such intrusions into personal "freedom" could only
be justified, or, more likely, supported by their constituents, by concern for
the public health.
The Davis ordinance casts a wide net in defining the extent to which
"public" areas would be protected from smoking266 and augmented indoor
smoking restrictions in outdoor areas as well.2 67 Accordingly, in the following
outdoor areas, smoking is prohibited:
[At] public events including... sports events, entertainment, speak-
ing performances, ceremonies, pageants, and fairs. Seating provided
by eating establishments and bars. Entrances and exits to enclosed
public areas. Within the entryway of any enclosed public area ...
Within courtyards and other areas where air circulation may be im-
equitable health care for all Americans, would have outlawed the use of any tobacco (smoked
or smokeless) in all outdoor public places in Fnendship Heights. See id.; Susan Levine, Village
Mayor to Smokers: Butt Out!, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1996, at Al; Magyland Village Endorses A Ban
on Outdoor Smoking N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2000, at A9. But see Jo Becker, Outdoor Smoking Re-
straints Repealed, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2001, at B1.
261. Letter from Bette Racki, Davis City Clerk, to Business Owners/Employers of Davis,
California (March 2, 1993) (on file with author).
262. See Davis Ordinance, supra note 260 ("WHEAREAS, studies have shown some non-
smokers cannot dine in restaurants because of adverse reaction or annoyance from [ETS]; and.
• . a majonty of travelers prefer nonsmoking sections in airplanes, buses, and trains.").
263. See id. Of the eleven justifications for the ordinance listed in the preamble, eight may
be deemed "health" concerns, two "nuisance" concerns, and one an "economic" concern. See
id.
264. See Art German, Neighbors, As Davis Residents Know, Where There's Smoke, There's Fear,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 2, 1995, at N4.
265. See, e.g., Davis Ordinance, supra note 260, at § 23A-9(x)-(x)(2), (4), (8), (9), (11), (12)
(prohibitng smoking within twenty feet of a restricted space, at outdoors events (such as pa-
rades, football games, and fairs), in outdoor bars and restaurants, at entrances to public areas,
while waing for a pay phone on the street, near street hot dog stands, in parks, and near open
windows of public areas, respectively).
266. Id at § 34.02.010(f-(w).
267. Id. at § 34.02.010.
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peded.... Areas not open to the sky. Any place where people are us-
ing or waiting for a service, entry, or transaction, including . . .
[Automated Teller Machines], bank teller windows, telephones, ticket
lines, bus stops, and cab stands. Any place where food and/or drink
is offered for sale. Children's play areas. Public gardens. Open win-
dows of any enclosed public area.
268
Honolulu, Hawaii's tobacco control ordinance, also enacted in 1993, is in
most respects much more conservative than that of Davis, California; it is
especially concerned with keeping certain outdoor parks and recreation facili-
ties smoke free.269 Indeed, the stated goals of this ordinance are the reduction
of litter, prevention of the nuisance created by tobacco smoke, and the limita-
tion of health risks.270 Since much of the city's revenue is generated by tour-
ism, which itself is driven by the natural beauty of the island, the maintenance
of the aesthetics of the city's parks and beaches is crucial not only to the psy-
chological well-being of citizens and visitors who visit them, it is crucial to the
economy of the city. The ordinance prohibits smoking, except in designated
areas, in the Honolulu Zoo, Hanauma Bay Beach and Nature Park, and Koko
Crater Botanical Garden.
271
B. Continuing Legislative Efforts
Since the enactment of the Davis and Honolulu ordinances there has
been a new trend toward more sweeping regulations being crafted which ban
smoking in all indoor public establishments-and, again, led by California in
1994 with its own legislation banning smoking in all publicly accessible build-
268. Id. Mesa, Arizona, was also a leader in 1996 in placing limits on the permitted use of
cigarettes in public places. MESA PUB. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, Ch. 11, § 6-11-1 (2000). The
full purpose of the ordinance reads:
Since the active smoking of tobacco and the inhalation of environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS) are dangers to human health and the most prevalent cause of preventable
death, disease, and disability, as well as are annoyances, inconveniences, discomforts,
and general health hazards to those wh are involuntarily exposed to such, and in order
to serve the public health, safety, and welfare, the declared purpose of this Chapter is to
protect people from dangerous, unnecessary, and/or involuntary health risks by pro-
hibiting the smoking of tobacco or any other plant in the City or public spaces and
places of employment, as defined in this Chapter.
Id.
269. See HONOLULU, HAw. REV. ORDINANCES ch. 41, art. 21 (1993).
270. See id.
271. See id. at 5 41-21.2(m). See also Susan Essoyan, News, Tips and Baigains: Smoking Banned
on Hawaiban Beaches, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at L3.
Similarly, the City of Bellaire, Texas, passed an ordinance forbidding smoking in the
city's public parks. See Tyler, supra note 228, at 805, n.173 (citing CBS Evening Newscast, June
8, 1996). The ban was justified on the grounds that the parks were used primarily by small
children who should not be exposed to the harms of cigarette smoke on the influence of smok-
ers. Id.
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ings. 272 This law pertained to such areas as office buildings and hospitals, as
well as all public restaurants. 2 3 Similarly, in 1995 New York City passed an
ordinance which prohibited smoking in most places of employment 274 As
with the California law, the New York City law applied to office buildings and
restaurants, but also included some outdoor venues such as sports stadiums.2 7 5
And, by the end of 1995, over 1,000 local tobacco control ordinances were in
place throughout the country.
276
C. New Initiatives
1. Santa Monica's Beaches
Following the initial lead of Honolulu, Hawaii, in 1993, to prohibit
smoking on its beaches, 277 Santa Monica, California, passed an ordinance on
April 27, 2004, that restricts smoking on its public beaches. The statute seeks
to address a serious environmental problem: cigarette butts litter the beaches
and, when swept into the ocean, they become a biohazard for aquatic life
when the toxic chemicals in the cigarettes are released into the oceans.
278
Defining smoke or smoking as, "[t]he carrying or holding of a lighted
pipe, cigar, cigarette, or any other lighted smoking product or equipment used
272. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19,994.30-.35 (West 1994); CAL. LAB. CODE 16404.5 (West
2006) (prohibiting tobacco smoking products being used in "100% of enclosed places of em-
ployment in the state ... thereby eliminating the need of local governments to enact workplace
smoking restrictions. Among those areas excluded from the coverage are: meeting and banquet
rooms in hotels and motels" retail or wholesale tobacco shops and private smokers' lounges;
cabs of motortubes; private residences; gaming clubs; bars and taverns devoted primarily to
serving alcoholic beverages for consumption in which food is incidental). See generaly Damon
K. Nagami, Enforcement Methods Used in Applying the Californa Smoke-Free Workplace Act to Bars and
Taverns, 7 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENVT'L L. POL'Y 159 (2001).
273. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19,994.30-.35; CAL. LAB. CODE 5 6404.5.
274. See N.Y. CITYADMIN. CODE §§ 17-501 through -514 (1995).
The New York Indoor Smoke-Free Air Act of 2002 tightens the pre-existing prohibi-
tions on smoking in public places and places of employment yet permits restricted smoking in
separate smoking rooms or lounges in sports and recreational areas and/or places of employ-
ment. A summarized and easily understood analysis of this complex law is to be found at.
http://smokefree.ash.positive-dedicated.net/images/pdfs/new york-case-study
%20Smokefree%20Liverpool.pdf (last visited March 17, 2007). See also Michaet Cooper, Major
Signs Law to Ban Smokng Soon at Most Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at B3.
275. N.Y. CITYADMIN. CODE 5§ 17-503 (a)(11) (1995).
276. See CAL. GOV'T CODE 5519,994.30, .33(c), .34 (West 1994); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit 8,
55148 (2006); supra notes 253-254 and infra 294-296, 301 and accompanying text (detailing
current muicipal and state legislative statistics).
277. HONOLULU, HAW. REV. ORDINANCE, 4 1-21.2(m) (1993).
278. SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE § 4.44.020 (2006). See also John Ritter, Tobacco War
Hits Beaches in Cakfornia, USA TODAY, June 21, 2004, at 3A; Nick Madigan, More Caifornia Air
Space Setfor No-Smoke Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004 at A16.
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to burn any tobacco product .... ,"279 the Santa Monica ordinance prohibits
such use in elevators, public parks, public beaches, "[a]nywhere on the Santa
Monica Pier; except in designated areas," outdoor service areas, inside public
buildings, "or within 2 feet of any entrance, exit or window of a public build-
ing."280 Violations are punishable by a $250.00 fine.
281
Forever seen as the trend setting state,282 California appears to honor this
characterization by its current efforts to restrict smoking on all the beaches-
not just Santa Monica-in the state's 1,100 mile coastline by making them
smoke-free. 283 Other initiatives are aimed at raising the smoking age from
eighteen to twenty-one and pressing Hollywood to assign an "R" or restricted,
movie ratings for those movies featuring smoking scenes.
284
For years, California has led most states by "prohibit[ing] smoking in vir-
tually every indoor public place." 285 While the East and West Coasts have led
the movement toward smoking curtailment, the American Lung Association
of California, has found nearly half of the states-particularly those in the
Midwest and the South-are lagging in their efforts here.
286
2. Calabasas, California
In February, 2006, the Calabasas City Council, representing a community
of 25,000 people outside of Los Angeles, enacted an ordinance which now
ranks as one of the toughest anti-smoking laws in the nation. Yet, the Council
prefers to label the ordinance a secondhand smoke exposure law rather than a
smoking ban.287 As such, Calabasas is now among more than 700 cities which
have ordinances limiting, to some degree, outdoor smoking.
288
The Calabasas ordinance not only prohibits smoking in all public places
(indoors and outdoors) where one might be exposed to secondhand smoke-
such as parks, sidewalks, outdoor cafes, bus stops, and athletic fields-but in
one's own car if the windows are open and, thus, exposing others to the sec-
ondary smoke. 289 For recidivists who choose not to respect anti-smoking
279. SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE §4.44.010 (2006).
280. SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE S4.44,020 (2006).
281. Id.
282. Ritter, supra note 278.
283. Id. See REID, supra note 82 (providing an analysis of the California anti-smoking cam-
paign).
284. Ritter, supra note 278.
285. Id. See also CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 19,994.30-.35 (West 1994).
286. Ritter, supra note 278. For a survey of state case and statutory law regulating smoking
in the fifty states, see How Are States Regulating Smoking in Public Places?, 3 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICsl57 (2002).
287. See Bob Pool, Smoking Ban Moves Outdoors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2006, at Al.
288. John M. Broder, Smoking Ban Takes Effect, Indoors and Outdoors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2006, at 18.
289. Id.
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Model ordinances have been proposed by national organizations-with
perhaps the most prominent being the Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights.
29 1
In each of these, a balance is struck in defining regulated and nonregulated
areas in the workplace and in public spaces, imposing signage or "No Smok-
ing" restrictions and structuring enforcement mechanisms. To a very large
degree, the AMA ordinance parallels, and indeed incorporates, the significant
provisions of the Nonsmokers' Rights Ordinance. In fact, the Nonsmokers'
Ordinance has become the model for most jurisdictions tackling the smoking
issue.
292
VII. CLARITY AND PRECISION IN DRAFTMANSHIP: TOWARD A MODEL
STATUTE
Presently, nearly every state has some form of restriction governing
smoking in public places, and countless municipalities have enacted similar
restrictions. 293 Indeed, at the start of 2004, some 281 municipalities in twenty-
three states had specific smoking bans in place for workplaces, as well as res-
taurants and bars-with five states, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
and New York, being listed as smoke-free.
294
290. Id.
291. Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, Model Ordinance Eliminating Smoking in All
Workplaces and Public Places (100% Smokefree), Feb. 2007 [hereinafter Model Ordinance].
See generaly, Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Poliics ofAnti Smoking Legislation: Lessons from Six States,
1 J. HEALTH, POL. POL'Y & L. 787 (1993); N.A. Rigotti & C.L. Pashos, No Smoking Laws in the
United States: An Analysis of State and Cioy Actions to Limit Smoking in Pubic Places and Workplaces,
266JAMA 3162 (1991).
292. See Model Ordinance, supra note 291.
The American Nonsmokers' Rights Foundation publishes pertinent lists and charts
which include a Table of Municipalities with Local 100% Smoke-free Laws, a Cumulative Chart
of Municipalities with Local Clean Indoor Air Laws, and a List of Municipalities with Local
100% Smoke-free Workplace and/or Restaurant (and Bars) Laws. See American Nonsmoker's
Rights Foundation, Municipaliies with Local 100% Smokefree Laws, April 2, 2007, http://www.no-
smoke.org/pdf/100ordlisttabs.pdf. A comprehensive synopsis of the case law in the fifty states
regarding their responses to regulating smoking in public places is avaliable at How Are States
Regulating Smoking in Public Places?, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 157 (2002).
293. See REDUCING TOBACCO USE, supra note 45, at 200-01 (stating that as of December 31,
1999, forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and 850 municipalities had enacted public
smoking regulations). The five states without public smoking regulations as of December 31,
1999 are Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Wyoming. Id. at 200.
294. Id See also Take It Outside, Smokers, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004, at 12A. See generally Ron
Harris, Smoking or Non?, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2004, at Al; Stanton A. Glantz &
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Interestingly, as of April, 2006, 461 municipalities in thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia had adopted one-hundred percent smoke-free
coverage in restaurants, bars or workplaces; 295 and 135 municipalities had one-
hundred percent coverage in all three of these. 296 And, since 2004, ten more
states passed legislation thereby qualifying for listing as totally smoke-free or
smoke-free in one of the three categories.
297
The overall effectiveness of these regulations has yet to be proven.
Once enacted, many restrictions on smoking have been hampered by ineffec-
tive implementation and enforcement.298 There are several reasons for this.
First, it has been contended that in most cases, inadequate resources are de-
voted to enforce anti-smoking laws once they are implemented.299 Instead,
enforcement has been undertaken when complaints were received rather than
on an on-going and consistent basis.300 Additionally, the laws regulating
smoking are often written in ambiguous language that fails to address specifi-
cally against whom, and to what extent, enforcement is to be undertaken. 3°
In order for future regulations to be effective these problems must be ad-
dressed by providing specific enforcement provisions, clearly defined sanc-
Lisa R.A. Smith, The Effect of Ordinances Requiing Smoke-Free Restaurants and Bars on Revenues. A
Follow-Up, 87 AM.J. PUB HEALTH 1687 (1997).
295. AMERICAN NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/l00ordlisttabs.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
296. Id.
297. Id.
The states are: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.204 (West 2004) (workplaces and res-
taurants); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. SS 39-5502-5503 (2004) (restaurants); Massachusetts,
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 270 S 22 (West 2004) (bars, restaurants and workplaces); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-40-103, 04 (2005, effective in 2009) (bars, restaurants and work-
places); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-12-10 (2005) (workplaces); Rhode Island, R-I.
GEN. LAws §§ 23-20.10-3,-4 (2004) (bars, restaurants, and workplaces); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAws §22-36-2 (2004) (workplaces); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. 526-38-2,-3 (2004)
(restaurants); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. Tit 18, §1744 (2005) (bars and restaurants); and Wash-
ington, REV. CODE WASH., §70.160.020 et seq. (2005) (enclosed workplaces, bars, and restau-
rants). Colorado's smoke-free restaurant and bar legislation went into effect July 1, 2006. For a
unified list of all fifteen states which have adopted one-hundred percent smoke-free coverage in
bars, restaurants and/or workplaces see supra notes 253-254 and accompanying text.
298. Peter D. Jacobson & Jeffrey Wasserman, The Implementaion and Enforcement of Tobacco
Control Laws: Poligy Implications for Actiwsts and the Industry, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'V & L. 567,
586 (1999). It has been suggested that failing to enforce anti-smoking laws has been the most
significant barrier to such laws being effective. Id.
299. Id. at 585.
300. See id.
301. See id. For example, in Califorma, several city attorneys advised local authorities not to
issue citations because ambiguous statutory language would never withstand judicial scrutiny.
Id. Additionally, in Flagstaff, Arizona the failure to adequately distingush between restaurants
(where smoking was prohibited) and bars (where smoking was allowed) permitted several local
restaurants to be exempt from the ordinance merely by claiming that they were bars rather than
restaurants. Id.
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tions, and precise language regarding where and when smoking is prohib-
ited.3
02
A. Seeking Uniformity as a Means to Further Progress
One solution to the barriers currently standing in the way of effective
anti-smoking regulations is to create a model statute to serve as the basis for a
consistent and fair regulatory standard.30 3 The current paradigm is one where
"[s]moking may be forbidden in certain locations in one municipality but al-
lowed in similar locations in a neighboring municipality." 304 A model statute
should attempt to alleviate such inconsistency and provide a foundation upon
which local representatives of the people could assemble ordinances reasona-
bly tailored to meet the particular needs of their community.
A model statute must be reasonable in order to withstand court chal-
lenges. More specifically, the model statute should seek to utilize the police
power of state and local governments in a way that is "calculated reasonably
to achieve the desired result," which in this case would be protecting the pub-
lic from the harms of ETS.305 The goal, then, in crafting a model statute
should be to provide a sound basis upon which to protect the public health
and welfare to the fullest extent possible without unnecessarily infringing
upon the liberty of smokers.
To date, the anti-smoking movement has had the greatest impact at the
state and local levels. 306 As the cause is advanced further, this level of gov-
ernment should remain the critical point of focus. However, in light of the
strong opposition likely to be encountered, it would be wise to be armed with
a statute that has not only been tested, but is also consistent with other suc-
cessful regulations already in place. In this regard, a model statute seems an
obvious asset. Additionally, current ordinances such as those in New York
City, 307 and California,30 8 should be consulted and analyzed in order to formu-
late a strategic and well thought out plan as the anti-smoking movement edges
forward.
302. See id. at 584-87.
303. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Extinguishing Brush Fires: Legal Limits on the Smoking of Tobacco,
53 U. C1N. L. REv. 435, 446-47 (1984) (highlighting the "'patchwork quality" of current anti-
smoking laws).
304. Id. at 447.
305. Id. at 450. See also Swason v. Tulsa, 633 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981)
(upholding a ban which required signs to be posted informing the public where smoking was
and was not perrmtted); Alford v. Newport News, 260 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1979) (requiring smok-
ing ban to provide more language precise enough to allow the ban to have more than an incon-
sequential effect).
306. Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Pokgy Change: The Case of
Smoking and Guns, 24J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 421, 436 (1999).
307. See statutes cited supra notes 34, 282-283.
308. See statutes cited supra notes 268, 280-281, 287.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Seeking a Balance
The debate over when and to what extent the government may regulate
public smoking is a contentious one where, each side holds firm beliefs as to
why its position is the appropriate one.30 9 It is not entirely clear, at this point,
where the line will be drawn with regard to an individual's right to smoke in
public. It may stop at public restaurants and the workplace; or it may reach as
far as public stadiums, outdoor gathering spots, and public streets. This line
will be defined in time, as the debate continues and additional regulations are
adopted.
Regardless of the eventual outcome of this debate, the fact remains that
it is a contentious one, which elicits strong emotional responses on both sides.
As such, it is imperative that reason and respect prevail as the public welfare
consequences of smoking regulations are weighed and debated. 310 A civilized
and informed dialogue and debate on the issue must prevail over a raucous
display of aggressive advocacy on either side. While it is important that con-
cise and effective regulations are enacted, ultimately, it appears that respecting
the rights of all of the individuals involved and making decisions based upon
sound data rather than aggressive advocacy of the parties is the best means of
ensuring that new regulations are both rational and fair, and therefore more
likely to withstand scrutiny and have the positive effects they were intended to
provide.311
Smoking does affect those who do it and also those who are exposed to
it involuntarily. Each of these groups has rights at stake and it is necessary
that neither groups' rights be infringed upon any more than reasonably neces-
sary to protect the public health. 312 This is the best service the government
can provide the citizens in this matter. Regardless of where, and to what ex-
tent, a regulation is implemented, it must be clear, concise, and free of ambi-
guity, both effective and enforceable, rationally based, and fair to all who are
affected by it. Liberty and personal free will require it, and the rational voice
of the people should demand it.
309. See W. Kip Viscusi, Second Hand Smoke Facts and Fantase, CATO REv. OF Bus. & GoV'T
(1995), https://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl8n3e.html. In 1977, sixteen percent of the
public supported banning smoking in public places, a figure which had nsen to sixty percent by
1988. Id. See also W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (1992); see generally
Jacobson et al., supra note 291.
310. Vicusi, supra note 309.
311. Id. See also Hogan, supra note 257.
312. See Do Smokers Have Rights? The Science and Politics of Tobacco, CATO POL'Y REP., Nov.-
Dec. 1994 (statement of William Niskanen), http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy-report /smoke-
pr.html. See also Hogan, supra note 257.
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B. Common Law Foundations and Permutations
As significant as common law reasoning is today in testing the perime-
ters of contemporary nuisance law, the imprecision of its application in seek-
ing to balance benefits and burdens in ascertaining the extent to which rea-
sonableness of conduct is met dictates that a sounder course of regulatory
action is to be found in the enactment of local ordinances and state statutes
which seek to codify the specific standards of conduct-or violations of
which are considered unreasonable an thus impose legal liability.
That the common law provides the conceptual foundation for most stat-
utes and administrative regulations is a given.313 It not only provides a frame-
work for all legal decision making, but fills the gaps in public law and thus
serves as a guiding presence for courts and agencies in their work of interpret-
ing statutes and applying rules.314 By codifying the common law tenets of
reasonableness-vis a vis the law of nuisance as restructured by the Restate-
ment of Torts315-a concrete approach to statutory interpretation is assured.
By achieving this combination, law-making thus becomes a more responsive
mechanism for resolving complex issues in public health such as cigarette
smoking.
By engrafting the new principle of chronic street nuisance onto the set-
fled doctrine of public nuisance, the common law tradition is adapted to the
realities of contemporary street culture seen in America. Since recognition of
this principle mandates a strict liability test, as with other public nuisances,
neither wrongful intent nor negligence is required to sustain an action brought
under it.316 The standard imposed for chronic street nuisances, because it
applies to everyone-regardless of their color or economic status-and
shaped by strict norms applicable to all ordinary pedestrians, must be seen as a
democratic one and without biases.
317
With a re-invigorated common law of public nuisance linked with wider
acceptability and use of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, the public
health battle against tobacco smoking will take a decisive turn. When these
two sets of principles are, in turn, codified into legislative provisions within
local ordinances and state statutes that seek to limit the effects of public
smoking, a formidable strategy for advancing the public health will be evi-
denced.
313. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVR1ONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW &
SOcIETY 103 (3d ed. 2004).
314. Id. at 104.
315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 55 827, 828 (1965).
316. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1185. Interestingly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts advocates
the imposition of strict liability for actions deemed, by statute, to be a public nuisance. 5 821 B
comts. c & e (1979).
317. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1185, 1186. But see Hogan, supra note 257,
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C. Legislative Framework and Evolving Social Norms
Public health law is tied, inextricably, to environmental law in the areas
of tobacco control. And, more and more, the relevance of property law to the
development of containment strategies becomes apparent. Indeed, it is within
the crucible of the common law doctrine of nuisance that statutory law finds
its loadstar.318 By recognizing and utilizing this synergistic interplay, an effec-
tive abatement strategy for tobacco smoking can be designed and imple-
mented.
Tobacco control programs without legislative components are unlikely to
succeed.319 Ultimately, it remains for policy makers to make a choice between
efforts undertaken to shape local government policies or, contrariwise, to
focus on the enforcement of a national policy restricting the use of tobacco
smoking.320 Inherent in this choice should be a realization that there is un-
avoidable conflict between the local and national levels of enforcement.
321 If
it is determined that local tobacco laws infringe upon the policies of the na-
tional government, state regulations restricting cigarette advertisements-for
example-will be invalidated.
322
Most would surely agree that smoking is-by any contemporary standard
of social civility-an "unaesthetic condition." 323 As such, it should be classi-
fied as an aesthetic public nuisance. Measured by well established standards
of both conduct and responsibility-as applied to aural and olfactory confron-
tations 324 -momentum for banning all public venues for smoking was gained
when, in 2000, the United States Public Health Service "urged physicians to
treat smoking aggressively just as they would other chronic illnesses."
325
An inherent part of any hoped-for success in coordinating a state-local-
federal policy for tobacco control is the need to change the attitude of the
citizenry-through education in the social and working environments as well
as the economic and informational ones-to the major health consequences
of smoking.326 In this regard, state-imposed legal sanctions designed to re-
duce cigarette smoking, "threats of shame" (or self-imposed punishment) and
"threats of embarrassment" (or socially imposed punishment) can be as effec-
tive-if perhaps not more so-in behavior modification than statutory and
318. PLATER ETAL., supra note 313, at 1307; POSNER, supra note 105, at § 3.8.
319. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Gabnel B. Eber, Tobacco ControlLegislation: Tools for Public Health
Improvement, 32J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 516 (2004).
320. Id. at 519-20.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 519. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
323. George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach
to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARv. ENVr'L L.J. 53, 67 (1997).
324. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVRIONMENTAL LAW §§ 5.1-3
(1977); Grinblatt, supra note 198.
325. Doctors Urged to Treat Smoking as Illness, WASH. POST, June 28, 2000, at A10.
326. Hodge & Eber, supra note 319, at 517-18.
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common law prohibitions. 327 At a minimum, behavioral or social constructs
can have a salutary effect in reducing "the expected utility of illegal behavior"
and thereby "increase the likelihood of compliance with the law."
'328
If there are to be significant and lasting changes in smoking behavior,
then, there must be directional changes in social norms which both acknowl-
edge and mandate smoke-free environments and complimentary or support-
ing life styles are not only encouraged but, indeed, preferred.329 Dramatic
changes of this nature can occur only over time within the macro context of
society acting through family units, the community, cultural constructs, eco-
nomic and physical environments, formal and informal governmental policy
making and prevailing legal norms.330 Thus far, the disappointing lack of pro-
gress in the containment of cigarette smoking is to be seen as more of a fail-
ure to implement pre-existing and well-tested strategies rather than an absence
of knowledge regarding what actions need to be undertaken.331
While no current statewide program for tobacco control that embraces
educational, 332 clinical, regulatory, economic, and social modalities can be seen
as ideal, the analysis presented in this Article fortifies the need for regulatory
action through local lawmaking that essentially codifies the common law stan-
dard of reasonable use and conduct found in the doctrine of public nuisance
and then implements its application in anti-smoking legislation as seen in
Calabasas and Davis, California, Honolulu, Hawaii, and the Americans for
Nonsmokers' Rights Model Ordinance. 333 Alternatively, broad state stat-
utes-such as the one seen in California334 -may be enacted which pre-empt
the need for local governments to initiate action, although of course, they
would bear ultimate responsibility for implementing these statutes.
One fact is almost certain. If strong frameworks for principled deci-
sionmaking are not developed and followed, the prediction of the World
Health Organization may well come to pass-namely, that by 2030, present
continued smoking patterns will not only cause fifty million premature deaths,
but will also see tobacco become the single leading cause of death worldwide
accounting for some ten million deaths per year.335
327. Poland, supra note 24, at 184.
328. Id.
329. REDUCING TOBACCO USE, supra note 45.
330. Id. at 373.
331. Id. at 436. Interestingly, a recent poll conducted by the Drug Policy Alliance, an advo-
cacy group, found forty-five percent of Amencans are in favor of illegalizing cigarettes. Rob
Stein, Drop in Smoking Rates Stalls, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2006, at A10.
332. REDUCING TOBACCO USE, supra note 45, at 416, 433.
333. See supra notes 263-291 and accompanying text; Model Ordinance, spra note 291.
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